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Fenster: Populism and Transparency

POPULISM AND TRANSPARENCY: THE POLITICAL CORE OF AN
ADMINISTRATIVE NORM
Mark Fenster*

I. INTRODUCTION
Transparency has become a preeminent administrative norm with
unimpeachable status as a pillar of democracy.2 Over the past several
decades, nations throughout the world have enacted new laws promising
a more thoroughly visible, accountable state.3 Academics and think tanks
have developed and provided support for the claim that information
disclosure can help solve political and social problems,4 while nongovernmental organizations advocate nationally and transnationally on
transparency’s behalf.5 No reasonable elected official would publicly
disavow government openness.
But the rise of right-wing populism, reminiscent of older forms of
militaristic authoritarianism,6 threatens transparency’s ascent. Recently
elected governments in Europe and the Americas represent a counter*. Stephen C. O’Connell Professor Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. Many
thanks to David Pozen and David Fontana for comments on earlier drafts. I am extremely grateful for fine
research assistance from Zoe Stein, Vanessa Gray, Nyja Brown, and Anne Kelley.
2. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THE FIRST 153 (2019) (characterizing transparency as a “theology”);
Christopher Hood, Transparency in Historical Perspective, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER
GOVERNANCE? 3 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 2006) (“Transparency has attained quasireligious significance in debate over governance and institutional design.”).
3. See ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
15–17 (2006); Greg Michener, FOI Laws Around the World, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 145, 145–46 (2011)
(describing rapid diffusion of FOI laws since 1990). The U.S. Freedom of Information Act’s influence on
the global application of transparency has been profound. See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information
Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1098–99, 1105–06 (2017) [hereinafter
Pozen, Freedom].
4. See, e.g., Padideh Ala’I & Robert G. Vaughn, Introduction, to RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
TRANSPARENCY 1 (Padideh Ala’i & Robert G. Vaughn eds., 2014) (recent collection of academic work
on national and international transparency laws); THE RIGHT TO KNOW (Ann Florini ed., 2007) (influential
work on comparative and international transparency policies); ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID
WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007) (influential work
evaluating effectiveness of transparency policies).
5. See COLIN DARCH & PETER G. UNDERWOOD, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 51–52, 103 (2010); ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 107–11.
6. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 12–13 (2018)
(likening the current rise of authoritarianism to Mussolini’s Fascist Italy); Y ASCHA MOUNK, THE PEOPLE
VS. DEMOCRACY: WHY OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER AND HOW TO SAVE IT 262–64 (2018) (likening the
current rise of authoritarianism to the Roman Republic).
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movement away from liberal-democratic institutions that promote the
visibility and popular accountability that transparency promises.7 Under
Vladimir Putin, Russia’s expansive state secrecy has enabled widespread
corruption.8 In Hungary, Victor Orbán’s Fidesz party has consolidated
power in order to establish what he has called an “illiberal state” that
limits access to information.9 Brazil’s Jair Bolsanaro, whose election in
2018 constituted a return to authoritarian right-wing leadership after more
than a decade of left-wing rule, has reduced government transparency and
led attacks on independent journalists.10 Even the United States, whose
fifty-year-old Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)11 has served as a
model for much of the activism that the age of transparency called forth, 12
7. See JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 88–108 (2016); CAS MUDDE & CRISTOBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER,
POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 62–78 (2017); Jan-Werner Müller, Populism and the People,
41 LONDON REV. BOOKS 35, 35 (2019), available at https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n10/jan-wernermuller/populism-and-the-people. African populists have demonstrated similar tendencies. See Danielle
Resnick, The Influence of Populist Leaders on African Democracy, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
GLOBAL POPULISM 267, 268 (Carlos de la Torre ed., 2018) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL
POPULISM] (discussing lack of transparency in populist South African and Zambian governments).
8. See Leanid Kazyrytski, Fighting Corruption in Russia: Its Characteristics and Purpose, 29
SOC. & L. STUD. 421, 421 (2019), doi:10.1177/0964663919859052; Kenneth Rapoza, In Russia, Putin
Prefers
Secret
Government,
FORBES
(May
19,
2013,
9:19
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/05/19/in-russia-putin-prefers-secretgovernment/#61dbfca846d1. The “Panama Papers” leak revealed the extent to which Russian oligarchs
and state officials secreted money from the country. See Roman Amin, Russia: Banking on Influence,
ORGANIZED
CRIME
&
CORRUPTION
REPORTING
PROJECT
(June
9,
2016),
https://www.occrp.org/en/panamapapers/rossiya-putins-bank/.
9. See Patrick Kingsley & Benjamin Novak, In Hungary, Viktor Orbán Showers Money on
Stadiums,
Less
So
on
Hospitals,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
26,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/world/europe/viktor-orban-soccer-health-care.html (noting that
Orbán’s “government has weakened accountability and transparency”); see also Lili Bayer, Orbán Rejects
EPP
Concerns
on
Rule
of
Law,
POLITICO
(June
13,
2019,
3:50
PM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-rejects-epp-concerns-rule-of-law/;
Gábor
Halmai,
Illiberalism in East-Central Europe, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE WORKING PAPERS (2019),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3486420; The entanglement of powers:
How Viktor Orban hollowed out Hungary’s democracy, ECONOMIST (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/08/29/how-viktor-orban-hollowed-out-hungarys-democracy.
10. See Jessie Bullock, The Bolsonaro Administration Is Quietly Reducing Transparency in Brazil,
GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Feb. 25, 2019), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2019/02/25/thebolsonaro-administration-is-quietly-reducing-transparency-in-brazil/; Andrew Downie, Bolsonaro is
making Brazilian journalists' jobs more difficult, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS BLOG (Mar. 21,
2019, 1:20 PM), https://cpj.org/blog/2019/03/bolsonaro-is-making-brazilian-journalists-jobs-mor.php.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (2018).
12. See Daniel Berliner, Alex Ingrams, & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, The Future of FOIA in an Open
Government World: Implications of the Open Government Agenda for Freedom of Information Policy
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has joined this trend under President Donald Trump, whose
administration proved less than compliant with FOIA and other
administrative laws and norms.13
Contemporary populist movements have not, however, entirely
rejected transparency as an ideal. The populist rebuke of power inequities
and its advocacy for popular sovereignty implicitly and sometimes
explicitly includes a demand for a more visible, accessible state. 14 Italy’s
populist Five Star Movement, for example, pledged to form an open
government by establishing direct communication channels with the
public,15 while Donald Trump found electoral success in part by
condemning President Obama16 and Hillary Clinton17 for their secrecy,
echoing complaints that transparency advocates themselves have made.18
and Implementation, , 63 VILL. L. REV. 867, 867 (2019); Pozen & Schudson, infra note 150, , at 2–3.
13. See infra Part III-A.
14. See generally MARGARET CANOVAN, THE PEOPLE 85 (2005) (noting that modern democracy’s
“sheer complexity offers a standing invitation to populists to insist on returning power to the people, while
denouncing as undemocratic all complicating institutional and legal structures”); Paula Diehl, Twisting
Representation, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POPULISM, supra note 6, at 129, 131 (identifying as central to
populism the embrace of popular sovereignty and denouncing government’s lack of accountability,
alienation from the people, and failure to represent the people and their interests.”). Left-wing populists
make similar claims. See Marco Damiani, Radical Left-wing Populism and Democracy in Europe, in
HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POPULISM, supra note 6, at 295, 298 (discussing left-wing populist movements
in Spain and France).
15. See Marco Bassini, Rise of Populism and the Five Star Movement Model: An Italian Case
Study, 11 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 302, 314, 327 (2019); see also Rogers Brubaker, Why Populism? 46 THEORY
& SOC. 357, 366 (2017) (discussing communicative strategies among varied populist parties and
government in Hungary, India, and the Netherlands).
16. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 6, 2012, 1:31 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/210423753388208128 (“Why is @BarackObama spending
millions to try and hide his records? He is the least transparent President—ever—and he ran on
transparency.”); see generally MICHAEL D’ANTONIO, NEVER ENOUGH: DONALD TRUMP AND THE
PURSUIT OF SUCCESS 284-96 (2015); Kathryn Olmsted, Fringe Paranoia Goes Mainstream, 1 MOD. AM.
HIST. 243, 245 (2018).
17. See Matthew Yglesias, The 2016 Election Really Was Dominated by a Controversy over
Emails,
VOX
(Nov.
20,
2018,
9:01
AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2016/12/25/14037576/trump-won-because-of-emails; Frank Newport et al., “Email” Dominates
What
Americans
Have
Heard
About
Clinton,
GALLUP
(Sept.
19,
2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/195596/email-dominates-americans-heard-clinton.aspx. See also Sven
Engesser et al., Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology, 20 INFO.
COMM. & SOC. 1109, 1117 (2017) (describing populist criticism of lack of transparency by Austrian
populists).
18. See, e.g., Alex Howard, How should history measure the Obama administration’s record on
transparency?,
SUNLIGHT
FOUND.
(Sept.
6,
2016,
12:35
PM),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/09/02/how-should-history-measure-the-obama-administrations-
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As a recent book on populism explained, populist movements “tend to
call for more transparency and the implementation of more democracy . .
. to break the alleged stranglehold of the elite” when they are out of
power.19 Upon gaining power, populist leaders have continued to decry
the secret forces they claim are arrayed against them. Their concerns
invoke conspiratorial enemies and a “deep state.”20 One could simply
dismiss populists’ seemingly hypocritical embrace of transparency in the
face of their resistance to open government mandates as little more than
a cynical ploy by contemptuous leaders who oppose disclosure of their
own political and personal dealings in any form.21 This is no doubt at least
in part true, as right-wing populists generally derogate to second-order
status (or worse) a concept rooted in liberal democratic theory and goodgovernment practices.
But as a governance ideal, transparency has important historical
connections and conceptual affiliations with populism. It arose from and
is based on the presumptions that citizens must see the state that not only
rules but serves them, and that failure to achieve that goal creates a state
that is illegitimate, inefficient, and corrupt—presumptions that connect
directly with populism’s normative ideals. A transparent state, however,
requires laws, regulations, and norms. Grafted onto the modern
administrative state, the complex rules that impose transparency have
required their own technocratic bureaucracy to foster compliance and
enable enforcement. Open government’s detailed, voluminous rules and
record-on-transparency/ (concluding, based on reports from transparency advocacy groups, that Obama
administration’s record was mixed and failed to meet its promises); Bill Allison, For candidates in 2016,
transparency
is
expected,
SUNLIGHT
FOUND.
(Mar.
11,
2015,
4:00
PM),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/03/11/for-candidates-in-2016-transparency-is-expected/ (criticizing
Clinton for her use of a private email server while conducting official business as Secretary of State).
19. Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 6, at 93.
20. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2018, 7:19 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1037661562897682432 (“The Deep State and the Left, and
their vehicle, the Fake News Media, are going Crazy - & they don’t know what to do.”); Franklin Foer,
Viktor
Orbán’s
War
on
Intellect,
ATLANTIC
(June
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/george-soros-viktor-orban-ceu/588070/ (quoting
Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán’s warning of an enemy that is “[n]ot open, but hiding; not
straightforward, but crafty; not honest, but base”).
21. See, e.g., Ben Norton, “FOIA Superhero” Launches Campaign to Make Donald Trump's
Administration Transparent, SALON (Nov. 27, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/11/27/foiasuperhero-launches-campaign-to-make-donald-trumps-administration-transparent
(quoting
FOIA
advocate as asserting that “[t]he Trump administration has made it clear that it is entirely hostile to the
notion of transparency”).
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the complexity of bureaucratic implementation operate in tension with the
concept’s populist understanding of a simple, visible state. The
relationship between transparency and populism, which has not received
sufficient academic attention,22 illuminates and explains transparency’s
complicated politics and administrative frustrations in a period of
renewed populism, as well as in the inevitable reaction against it.
This Article explains the connections and tensions between
transparency and populism. Part II introduces populism as a general
political phenomenon that has emerged and evolved over the past century.
Shifting between left and right, and occasionally mixing political
elements in novel ways that are contingent upon their particular historical
circumstances, populist movements claim to authentically construct and
then represent an idea of “the people” in opposition to an “elite” power
bloc. Part III discusses how populism’s complaints about secrecy among
the elite and powerful overlap with the complaints about secrecy that
transparency advocates make. Both populists and transparency advocates
tend to view power and its exercise skeptically, 23 and both claim that an
22. The most significant exception is the anthropologist Kregg Hetherington’s work on the
relationship between transparency and populism in Paraguay. See KREGG HETHERINGTON, GUERRILLA
AUDITORS: THE POLITICS OF TRANSPARENCY IN NEOLIBERAL PARAGUAY 189 (2011); Kregg
Hetherington, Populist Transparency: The Documentation of Reality in Rural Paraguay, 1 J. LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 45, 47 (2008). See also MARK FENSTER, THE TRANSPARENCY FIX: SECRETS, LEAKS,
AND UNCONTROLLABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 37-38 (2017) (discussing relationship in passing);
NADIA URBINATI, ME THE PEOPLE: HOW POPULISM TRANSFORMS DEMOCRACY 60-61, 180-83 (2019).
Instead, commentators and political theorists have described transparency variously: as an essential liberal
democratic norm and human right that transcends the political, see, e.g., SUZANNE J. PIOTROWSKI,
GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 10 (2007) (“Not only does
transparency give us a better understanding of what government is doing, but it encourages those who
work for government to better meet their obligation to us); Patrick Birkinshaw, Transparency as a Human
Right, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 47 (Christopher Hood & David Heald
eds., 2006) (“Not only is [freedom of information] instrumentally important in realizing other human
rights such as freedom of speech and access to justice or other desiderata such as accountability, it is
intrinsically important: the right to know how government operates on our behalf.”); as a consequentialist
tool to hold the state accountable and limit corruption, see, e.g., Archon Fung & Stephen Kosack, Does
Transparency Improve Governance? 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 65 (2014) (reviewing empirical literature
on transparency as an accountability tool); as a lever by which parties and politicians impugn incumbents
and opponents, see text accompanying supra notes 102-105; and as a means used by private actors to
further commercial and ideological interests. See Margaret Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016)
(commercial uses of FOIA); David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 108–
15 (2018).
23. Populists view the exercise of power skeptically when they are out of power; transparency
advocates view the exercise of power especially skeptically when they are dissatisfied with the lack of
information or candor surrounding its use.
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increased flow of information and communication enables and even
encourages political reform by forcing the state to reveal itself. But they
are not identical. Whereas transparency advocates emphasize technical
mandates and widely-recognized but unwritten norms of disclosure,
populists champion simpler political norms and emotional connections
among leaders, movements, and the public. Transparency is understood
and promoted in both populist and technocratic registers, and the
differences between them at times render the concept contradictory, even
perhaps at times meaningless.
Part IV uses Donald Trump’s presidential term as a case study in the
relationship between transparency and populism. It begins by describing
the extent to which his administration failed to comply with formal
administrative laws and well-established disclosure norms. Nevertheless,
the former president and his supporters claim that he in fact governed
quite transparently24 through his direct, affective public communication
rather than by complying with the laws and norms of public
administration. He offered a seemingly accessible version of his thoughts
and emotions in real time through his Twitter account and his extended,
often improvisational performances during the rallies he continued to
hold after his election. Thus, President Trump simultaneously departed
from administrative laws and norms while repeatedly invoking their
spirit, and in the process sought to reframe transparency’s meaning in
terms more favorable to his manner of governance.
Part V concludes by explaining how right-wing populism’s rise has laid
bare transparency’s internal conflict between its status as an
administrative concept defined and implemented by law, regulations, and
norms, and its operation as a contested political concept that overlaps with
populism. The tension between these distinct ways of understanding
transparency clarifies both transparency’s politics and its limitations and
disappointments.
II. POPULISM: THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE ELITE
Populism has regularly waxed and waned as a prominent political force

24. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 24, 2019, 9:47 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1121048120312389634 (“No Collusion, No Obstruction there has NEVER been a President who has been more transparent.”).
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since its formal emergence in the U.S. during the late 19th century,25
despite the apocalyptic dangers to democracy its critics regularly predict
will follow in populism’s wake. 26 It continues to play a key role in the
modern political understanding of popular sovereignty27 and has regained
its standing in the last decade. In the U.S. for example, populist ideas
circulated in the Tea Party’s insurgency among the Republican base
during the Obama presidency, the Occupy Wall Street movement on the
political Left, beginning in 2011, and then among both Democrats and
Republicans in the 2016 election.28 Right-wing populism’s current rise in
European nations began well before the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 29
Left-wing populist parties have been successful in Greece and Spain,30
and populism has been a constant and prevalent strain of Latin American
politics since the previous century. 31 Despite scholars’ normative
disagreement over populism’s significance, I explain in this Part, the
academic literature has reached a general consensus about certain of its
characteristics.32
25. Judis, supra note 6, at 18–19.
26. See, e.g., WILLIAM GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 4-5 (2018) (characterizing populism as a “deformation of liberal democracy” and
symptomatic of the latter’s “worrying retreat”); JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 6 (2016)
(criticizing populism as “blatantly antidemocratic” and a “degraded form of democracy”); Aziz Z. Huq,
The People Against the Constitution, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1140-44 (2018).
27. Duncan Kelly, Populism and the History of Popular Sovereignty, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POPULISM 511, 529 (Cristóbal Rovia Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017).
28. Judis, supra note 6, at 53–87.
29. Europe’s surge in populism predated the current reemergence in the U.S. See generally
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY POPULISM: THE SPECTRE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY (Daniele
Albertazzi & Duncan McDonnell eds., 2008); CAS MUDDE, POPULISM IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS
(2012); CAS MUDDE, POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE (2007).
30. See Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Podemos: The Ambiguous Promises of Left-Wing Populism in
Contemporary Spain, 21 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 99 (2016); Marco Lisi et al., Economic Crisis and the Variety
of Populist Response: Evidence from Greece, Portugal and Spain, 42 W. EURO. POL. 1284 (2019); Yannis
Stavrakakis & Giorgos Katsambekis, Left-Wing Populism in the European Periphery: The Case of
SYRIZA, 21 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 119 (2014).
31. See MICHAEL L. CONNIFF ET AL., POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA (Michael L. Conniff ed., 2d
ed. 2012); CARLOS DE LA TORRE, POPULIST SEDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 2010).
32. The academic literature on populism reflects populism’s tendency to fluctuate in importance.
See generally CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 6–9 (2009) (offering an historiography of the
literature). One can find an enormous range of hand-wringing critiques of populism as an historical
phenomenon and more focused, limited embraces of certain aspects of populist politics and the history of
populist movements, usually reflecting the commentator’s political commitments. Compare JOHN
LUKACS, DEMOCRACY AND POPULISM: FEAR AND HATRED (2005) (condemning populism’s key role in
all of the destructive political movements and events of the 20th Century), with John B. Judis, Rethinking
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A. Populism’s Dualist Vision
Current and past populist movements tend to share strong but thin
political commitments. Most significantly, they promote deep-seated,
dualist visions of the political and social world, on one side of which
stands the “people” that a movement calls into existence and whose
interests it claims to champion. On the other side is the existing structure
of power and the power bloc that controls it. 33 This dualism reduces
political debate and noise to simple binaries between vague, undefinable
categories.34 Populist movements and leaders promise to transform the
political and social order by restoring the people (in whatever way they
are defined) to their rightful place in power and moral authority through
self-rule. What was once broken will be repaired; the people that had been
divided will find a unified wholeness under their own direct rule.
Populism’s foundational division between people and the power bloc
produces three additional binaries that lend specificity and definition to
each populist movement.35 The first is that the power bloc represents the
interests of an “elite.”36 Individual movements fill this vague category
distinctly. Right-wing populists generally define the elites they oppose in
intellectual and cultural terms, while left-wing populists tend to
concentrate their hostility on economic elites.37 The population of these
elites may overlap, but different kinds of populist movements condemn
elites for perpetrating different wrongs. Second, populist movements
Populism, DISSENT 16 (Fall 2016) (describing populism, and political theories of populism, as a positive
development), and CHANTAL MOUFFE, FOR A LEFT POPULISM (2018) (embracing populism for a renewed
left politics). Social scientists and political theorists provide a less normative, more descriptive account
of populism’s development and effects. See JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH (rev. ed. 1998);
MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6; MÜLLER, supra note 6; Margaret Canovan, Trust the People!
Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, 47 POL. STUD. 2 (1999); POPULISM: ITS MEANING AND
NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS (Ghita Ionescu & Ernest Gellner eds., 1969); OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POPULISM (Cristóbal Rovia Kaltwasser et al., eds., 2017); POPULISM AND THE MIRROR OF DEMOCRACY
(Francisco Panizza ed., 2005).
33. Canovan, supra note 31, at 3–4.
34. See generally ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON 18 (2005) (explaining that populist
reason “simplifies the political space, replacing a complex set of differences and determinations by a stark
dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily imprecise”).
35. See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6; MÜLLER, supra note 25, at 19–22.
36. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 11–14; MÜLLER, supra note 25, at 2–3;Canovan,
supra note xx, at 3–4.
37. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note XX, at 12–13; MÜLLER, supra note xx, at 2–3; Canovan,
supra note 31, at 3–4.
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express deep skepticism about pluralism as a political theory and about
pluralistic governance as a preeminent institutional and procedural
principle.38 This binary rests on a deep suspicion of governing
institutions, including the state, civil service, and political parties, which
appear structurally and inevitably unjust to unprivileged commoners.39
Electoral contests too appear unfair or even fixed. Third, the boundary
between people and the power bloc radiates from some defined identity,
drawn in terms of nation, race/ethnicity, masculinity, class, or some
combination thereof. The idea of a “people” draws categorical boundaries
between those who are within and outside of the group, in the process
shaping the individual and group ideal of the people whose interests the
movement would further.40
B. Populism’s Claim to Authenticity
Populist movements contend that the existing power bloc fails to
represent the legitimate majority’s true interests.41 At its core, populism’s
anti-elitism rejects what it views as the hidden nature of the present
institutional order.42 Bureaucracies that operate and communicate in a
technocratic manner—relying on their expertise as authority, engaging in
complex but facially fair procedures, and communicating in dry, neutral
language—appear especially suspect when contrasted with a populist
38. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 7–8; MÜLLER, supra note 25, at 3.
39. LACLAU, supra note 33, at 137; Kenneth M. Roberts, Populism and Political Powers, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra note 31, at 287, 289–90.
40. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 18–19; MÜLLER, supra note 25, at 3–4. Current rightwing populist movements have tended to emphasize national identity as their core principle, but they often
tie their idea of nationhood to race, ethnicity, and ideology as well. As Benjamin De Cleen has argued,
populism and nationalism are not coextensive, and just as not all populists are nationalists, so not all
nationalists are populists. See Populism and Nationalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra
note 31, at 342, 358–59.
41. Populism’s theory of representation presumes that distance and intermediation necessarily
interfere with popular sovereignty and therefore prevent the people’s rule. For more complex theories of
representation, see, for example, HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967) (the
canonical consideration of the issue in political theory); Mónica Brito Vieira, Introduction to RECLAIMING
REPRESENTATION : CONTEMPORARY ADVANCES IN THE THEORY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
(Mónica Brito Vieira ed., 2017) (providing a history and literature review of representation as a concept
in political theory).
42. See EDWARD SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 44-47 (1956); Yannis Papadopoulos,
Populism, the Democratic Question, and Contemporary Governance, in DEMOCRACIES AND THE
POPULIST CHALLENGE 45, 47, 57 (Yves Mény & Yves Surel eds., 2002).
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style that appeals directly to the people in plain, emotional language. 43
Any legislative and executive institutions that would illegitimately
buttress state authority while falsely claiming to represent the people do
so without the people’s knowledge or approval.
Populist movements make two promises to correct this problem: they
pledge to remove the distance between the people and state by offering a
truer form of representation, one that authentically pursues the public’s
real interests by respecting the people’s sovereignty;44 and they promise
to banish anything hidden from the public that would interfere with this
newly direct, redemptive relationship between state and public.45 The
people will rule themselves through their authentic representative(s).46
Benjamin Arditi has characterized populism’s ability to engage “an
imaginary identification” among movement followers that feels direct and
unmediated.47 The charismatic leadership that populist movements
typically rally around helps to create such identification, allowing one or
a small number of leaders to represent and speak for the whole, in the
process establishing popular loyalty to the leader and group.48 The
immediacy of these feelings, apparent in followers’ evident devotion to
the populist cause or leader at gatherings and rallies, demonstrates what
Chantal Mouffe has identified as the “passions” of collective populist
identity—passions that existing political institutions consider suspect and
prevent from expression.49 Populist movements often appear insurgent
43. BENJAMIN MOFFITT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM: PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL STYLE, AND
REPRESENTATION 43–47 (2016); Paul Taggart, Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics, in
DEMOCRACIES AND THE POPULIST CHALLENGE 62, 76-77 (Yves Mény & Yves Surel eds., 2002).
44. See URBINATI, supra note 21, at 8-9. On the role of this ideal of the people in early U.S.
populist movements, see LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA (1976) ; MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2017). On its
role in 20th Century French and Russian populist movements, see KEVIN PASSMORE, THE RIGHT IN
FRANCE FROM THE THIRD REPUBLIC TO VICHY (2012); FRANCO VENTURI, ROOTS OF REVOLUTION: A
HISTORY OF THE POPULIST AND SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY RUSSIA (1960).
45. CANOVAN, supra note 13, at 89-90.
46. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 68.
47. Benjamin Arditi, Populism, or, Politics at the Edges of Democracy, 9 CONTEMP. POL. 17, 23
(2003).
48. See PAUL TAGGART, POPULISM 100–03 (2000); on “charismatic leadership” generally, see
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 242-44 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).a
49. Chantal Mouffe, The “End of Politics” and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism, in
POPULISM AND THE MIRROR OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 31, at 50, 51. See also Pierre Manent, Populist
Demagogy and the Fanaticism of the Center, AM. AFF. (Summer 2017), available at
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/populist-demagogy-and-the-fanaticism-of-the-center/ (“The
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and angry at the economic and social conditions under which their
followers claim to suffer, and their members invest themselves
emotionally in both the identity that the group has constructed and in the
movement’s leadership.50
Whether embodied in an individual or dispersed within a party or
movement, populist leadership claims to constitute true representation for
a singular people.51 Leaders express the popular will simply and starkly,
often through direct, performative mediated address to a mass audience
that takes advantage of their stature and celebrity.52 They traffic in
stereotypes, emphasize action, and offer what they propose as “common
sense” solutions rather than technical or abstract ones.53 Indeed, their
claim to truly represent the people in opposition to an elite establishment
invites them to exercise ostensibly bad manners, creating offense by
speaking bluntly and outrageously.54 Populists channel the popular will
by attempting to speak in the people’s voice more honestly and bravely
than the people themselves.
Populism is therefore not merely a group response to external stimuli
(such as an economic crisis), but a political and cultural style that is
creatively syncretic.55 Populist movements link together shared (if not
populist orientation is often said to have a ‘passionate,’ ‘extreme,’ or ‘irresponsible’ manner and tone. But
its content, too, is never credited with the characteristics of reason, moderation, and responsibility. The
term ‘populism’ denotes an orientation, a political opinion, or certain orientations or political opinions,
which are discredited and denounced.”).
50. See Canovan, supra note 31, at 6.
51. See MÜLLER supra note 25, at 20–23; SHILS, supra note 41, at 98–104.
52. MOFFITT, supra note 42, at 84–87 (2016); Julianne Stewart et al., Conclusion: Power to the
Media Managers, in THE MEDIA AND NEO-POPULISM: A CONTEMPORARY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 217,
228 (Gianpetro Mazzoleni, Julianne Stewart & Bruce Horsfeld eds., 2003). On the global rise of celebritypoliticians, and their relationship to populism, see generally DARRELL M. WEST & JOHN ORMAN,
CELEBRITY POLITICS (2003); MARK WHEELER, CELEBRITY POLITICS: IMAGE AND IDENTITY IN
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS (2013); David Marsh, Paul ’t Hart & Karen Tindall,
Celebrity Politics: The Politics of the Late Modernity, 8 POL. STUD. REV. 322 (2010).
53. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 68.
54. BENJAMIN ARDITI, POLITICS ON THE EDGES OF LIBERALISM: DIFFERENCE, POPULISM,
REVOLUTION, AGITATION 78 (2007) (characterizing the populist leader’s role as that of a “drunken dinner
guest”); Moffitt, supra note 42, at 57–63; see generally Pierre Ostiguy, Populism: A Socio-Cultural
Approach, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra note 31, at 73, 77–84 (discussing the
important tendency of populist leaders to deploy “low” social and political means of address to the public);
J. Eric Oliver & Wendy Rahn, Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election, 667 ANNALS OF
THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 189, 192–94 (2016).
55. See Canovan, supra note 31, at 4–5 (noting populism’s affirmative as well as reactive
tendencies); MOFFITT, supra note 42, at 50–51.
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necessarily correct) understandings of the past, criticisms of present
conditions, and visions of the future to form a new political framework
built upon issues that dominant parties and institutional politics ignore or
fail to acknowledge fully. Their invocation of a “people” is at once
affirmative, insofar as it builds a constituency through a collective
identity, and oppositional, since in doing so it excludes those outside the
group and constructs an enemy that seeks both to protect its status as
“elite” and to relegate the people to subservience. 56 At bottom, populist
movements intend to redeem and remake the world in the people’s image
(as they would define it), under the people’s rule, led by the people’s
authentic representative(s).57 They promise a state that will serve directly,
instrumentally, and affectively in the people’s interest—whoever that
people is, and whatever that people purportedly wants.
C. Populism’s Contingency
Populism’s Manichean vision and simple narrative—the identifiable
people in pitched battle against a power bloc that controls the existing,
seemingly democratic institutions—render it so vague as to be seemingly
meaningless as a political idea.58 Individual populist movements can
incline left or right, or offer a mix of proposals from different points on
the present political spectrum; they can also evolve in directions
seemingly opposite from where they started, especially once they find
success, while remaining true to the basic storyline they convey.59 And
the narratives they offer appear to pull in opposite directions, driven by
an internal tension between populism’s claims to offer radical change or
revolutionary transformation and its defense of a nationalist identity or
cherished, long-lost political principles. The emergence and development
of any movement therefore proves highly contingent on a nation’s or
region’s internal political dynamics—including its political system and
56. LACLAU, supra note 33, at 18; Canovan, supra note 31, at 4–5.
57. On populism as constituting a strong form of democracy’s “redemptive” face, see Canovan,
supra note 31, at 9–14.
58. See MÜLLER supra note 25, at 8–10.
59. See MOUFFE, supra note 31, at 11. Examples in the U.S. of figures who have individually
shifted from positions typically recognized as leftist to those understood as right-wing include William
Jennings Bryant, Tom Watson, and Father Charles Coughlin. See MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE
LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYANT (2006); KAZIN, POPULIST PERSUASION, supra note 43, at 40–46, 7480.
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parties—as well as on the current issues to which an individual movement
appears to be responding.60 This is equally true on different continents, as
the populism of North and South America differ considerably from that
of Europe, reflecting distinctions in political cultures, respective histories
as colonialists and colonies, and their relative states of economic
development.61
As a result, populism does not function as a freestanding political
concept in the manner of socialism, fascism, or neoliberalism, each of
which at least appear to sit somewhere on the political spectrum and stand
for something (even if their boundaries and substance might be
contested).62 Putative populist movements either operate within or find
themselves labeled as part of the political institutions and traditions that
they criticize. Among conservatives, “right-wing populists” and so-called
“authoritarian populists” distinguish themselves from elite or Burkean
conservatives.63 The “populist left” stands in opposition to the drift among
leftists and liberals towards neoliberalism and centrism.64 At the same
time that they radically challenge institutional parties, right- and left-wing
populists can draw from the same pool of disaffected voters. In the 2016
presidential election, for example, Donald Trump’s populist claims to
represent forgotten populations attracted at least some of those who had
backed Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primaries, despite the stark

60. See generally David Fontana, Unbundling Populism, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1482, 1488–94 (2018)
(discussing what he terms “unbundled populism,” which is free of the “worldviews” of a particular
moment).
61. See OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra note 31 (highlighting the connections and
comparative distinctions and departures among the populist governments and movements in different
nations and on different continents); see also Carlos de la Torre, Populism in Latin America, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra note 31, at 195, 196–203 (describing wide variety of populist movements
and leaders in Latin America).
62. See Canovan, supra note 31, at 4 (noting populism’s contingency and rejecting the notion of a
populist “ideology”).
63. See, e.g., CHIP BERLET & MATTHEW LYONS, RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN AMERICA: TOO
CLOSE FOR COMFORT (2000) (on the rise of right-wing populism in the 1990s); STUART HALL, THE HARD
ROAD TO RENEWAL: THATCHERISM AND THE CRISIS OF THE LEFT 39-56 (1988) (on the rise of
“authoritarian populism” in the 1980s in the US under Ronald Reagan and in the UK under Margaret
Thatcher).
64. See, e.g., MOUFFE, supra note 31 (arguing that to be relevant and recapture the ground lost to
authoritarian populism and neoliberalism, the left should embrace a form of democratic populism);
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY: BRINGING CAPITALISM BACK
INTO PROTEST ANALYSIS 96–102 (2015) (discussing Occupy Wall Street and other recent left populist
movements).
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divergence in their stances on particularly salient policy issues.65
This suggests that populism operates as a performative, rhetorical
practice, which allows different populist movements to share common
tropes while they articulate distinct political demands tied to the time and
place of their emergence.66 As the British sociologist Peter Worsley
explained, populism operates as “a dimension of political culture in
general, not simply as a particular kind of overall ideological system or
type of organization.”67 Viewed as a contingent political phenomenon
based on a set of vague but powerful binaries, populism is ultimately less
a political program than a “style,”68 a political rhetoric,”69 or a “mode of
political representation”70 that movements can appropriate to fit a given
set of concerns that are being ignored and to rally a segment of the
population that feels disregarded.
III. TRANSPARENCIES: A TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, AND POPULIST NORM
Like populism, government transparency is not simply one thing.
Everyone on the present political spectrum appears to embrace it as an
administrative norm (at least in theory), while its precise political valence
has evolved over the past five decades. 71 Most broad historical and
theoretical accounts of transparency associate its rise with progressive

65. PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURAL BACKLASH: TRUMP, BREXIT, AND
AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM 67-68 (2019); Danielle Kurtzleben, Here’s How Many Bernie Sanders
Supporters
Ultimately
Voted
For
Trump,
NPR
(Aug.
24,
2017,
2:53
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/24/545812242/1-in-10-sanders-primary-voters-ended-up-supportingtrump-survey-finds (reporting data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study finding that 12%
of those who had voted for Sanders in the Democratic primaries voted for Trump in the general election).
66. See MOFFITT, supra note 42, at 104–08 (characterizing populism’s invocation of “the people”
as performance); see generally MICHAEL SEWARD, THE REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM (2010) (emphasizing
the role of aesthetic and cultural components and an ongoing performance engaged in by a representative
to gain acceptance by a public).
67. Peter Worsley, The Concept of Populism, in POPULISM: ITS MEANING AND NATIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 31, at 212, 245.
68. Benjamin Moffit & Simon Tormey, Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political
Style, 62 POL. STUD. 381, 390-92 (2014).
69. KAZIN, POPULIST PERSUASION, supra note 43 , at 192–93.
70. Arditi, supra note 46, at 78–87.
71. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF
TRANSPARENCY, 1945-1975, at 4 (2015) (“Right, left, and center, there is broad support for the ideal of
transparency.”)
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good governance reforms,72 although specific chronicles of open
government legislation in particular jurisdictions note that party politics
and interbranch conflicts often motivate new transparency reforms.73
Taken together, these accounts demonstrate that “transparency” is neither
an essentially progressive, partisan, nor libertarian administrative norm—
although elements of each have both structured the norm historically and
occasionally emerged to dominate advocacy efforts. Nevertheless, the
term’s political and symbolic authority allows the transparency ideal to
transcend political partisanship and to take on different meanings based
on context and on those who claim its mantle.
This Part considers transparency’s multiple meanings and applications.
It first identifies transparency’s prescription in the laws and norms that
attempt to open a sprawling bureaucracy to view. Open government laws
inevitably prove long, complicated, and legalistic, and require continual
enhancement and enforcement against the vast complex of government
entities that make up the modern state. 74 This legal and normative
machinery constitutes transparency’s technocratic arrangement—the
means by which the state is made accessible, legitimate, and above all
democratic through a set of technical rules. 75 Then this Part turns to
transparency as a concept that both needs political support and is part of
partisan and institutional conflict. Finally, this Part argues that, in the
process of its political use, transparency’s populist elements can
predominate and undercut its technocratic implementation.

72. See David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 108–15 (2018)
[hereinafter Pozen, Drift].
73. For monographs that discuss the politics of freedom of information laws in individual
countries, see, for example, SCHUDSON, supra note 70, at 37–63 (on the U.S.); BEN WORTHY, THE
POLITICS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: HOW AND WHY GOVERNMENTS PASS LAWS THAT THREATEN
THEIR POWER 9–11 (2017) (U.K.); and PRASHANT SHARMA, DEMOCRACY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE
INDIAN STATE (2015).
74. On FOIA’s many amendments over the past fifty years, for example, see Sami Kerzel, FOIA:
Then and Now, DOCUMENTS TO THE PEOPLE, Winter 2016, at 22, available at
https://journals.ala.org/index.php/dttp/article/view/6226/8103.
75. The distinction I pose here between transparency’s technocratic and populist conception
parallels Jack Balkin’s use of progressivism and populism as “ideal” types in constitutional theory. J.M.
Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1944 (1995). My
use of the terms is not concerned with theory so much as its application: the technocratic effort to develop
and enforce rules and the deployment of populist rhetoric and ideas by historical actors. I situate my
account of transparency’s technocratic side within the concept’s development as an administrative norm
and my account of populism within its development in U.S. political history.
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A. Technocratic Transparency: Open Government as an Administrative
Norm
Sprawling both organizationally and spatially, modern government
resists visibility. Open government laws cannot magically and perfectly
unveil the state; rather, they can only address the traces of state operations
through legislation that attempts to mitigate bureaucracies’ inevitable
information hoarding.76 The disclosure of federal government records in
the U.S., for example, is mandated by a variety of laws, including the
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), while sub-federal states have their
own analogous but also quite distinct and variable laws.77 Various
preservation statutes require that these records are maintained and
archived.78 Open government laws create specific exemptions from
disclosure for certain types of records.79 Federal and state laws require
meetings to be open to the public, although the scope of these laws varies
widely among the various statutes and state constitutions that establish
the mandates.80 Administrative laws that regulate agency rulemaking and
adjudication require the disclosure of some government outputs that have
legal effect, as well as some of the inputs government produce and relies
upon to produce them.81 None of these laws are mechanical. Rather, each
relies upon broad, ambiguous standards and multi-factor balancing tests
established in complex statutes and court decisions.82

76. See DAVID BEETHAM, BUREAUCRACY 101-02 (2d ed. 1996); 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 992 1968).
77. See Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 643–
47 (2010) [hereinafter Fenster, Seeing the State].
78. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C.
§ 3301 et seq. (2018) (requiring creation, maintenance, and retention of records); FLA. STAT. § 119.01 et
seq. (2018) (Florida’s open records law).
79. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2018) (enumerating exceptions from disclosure requirements to
federal FOIA); FLA. STAT. § 119.071 (2019) (enumerating general exemptions from disclosure of public
records).
80. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 and 39 U.S.C. (1976)) (federal open meetings law); FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 24 (providing individual right of access to public records and meetings); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950
et seq. (Ralph M. Brown Act, California’s open meetings law).
81. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2018) (requiring federal agencies conducting informal
rulemaking to publish proposed rules in Federal Register and to incorporate in the final rules “a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose”).
82. For examples of contested, ambiguous language in open government laws, consider two of the
most recent FOIA decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, which settled long-disputed language in FOIA
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The federal versions of these laws in the U.S. focus on the executive
branch.83 But the President and White House (which enjoy certain
constitutional privileges from disclosure84) and federal agencies represent
only part of a much broader set of U.S. leviathans. By Constitution and
statute, the U.S. Congress85 and federal Judiciary86 face their own sets of
more limited disclosure requirements. And private entities and
individuals interact extensively with U.S. government entities, whether
by performing governmental duties or finding themselves subject to
regulatory enforcement. Open government laws vary in how they resolve
the difficult issue of when the public nature of the work that private
entities and public-private partnerships perform and their interactions
with the state compels disclosure.87 State constitutions and statutes handle
these same issues distinctly, while the federal constitution establishes
only a minimal baseline of disclosure requirements and rights of access.88

exemptions. See generally Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019) (settling
the meaning of FOIA § 552(b)(4) exempting “commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and . . . confidential”); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011) (settling the meaning of FOIA
§ 552(b)(2) exempting material “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency”).
On the contested definition of the “record” for purposes of litigation under the Administrative Procedure
Act, see Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A. Platt, Administrative Records and the Courts, 67 KAN. L. REV. 1
(2018). Statutory vagueness often leads courts to defer to agency decisions not to disclose records. See
Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 163–68 (2006); Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 211
(2013); Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
679, 719 (2002).
83. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018) (applying FOIA only to “each agency,” which is defined in 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(1) to exclude, among other entities, Congress and the courts).
84. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 933–41 (2006).
85. See Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 76, at 637–38 (2010); Adrian Vermeule, The
Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 410–22 (2004).
86. See Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 76, at 641-42; Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G.
Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution Constructs the Pathways of
Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 289–93 (2003).
87. See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Landyn Wm. Rookard, Private Government and the
Transparency Deficit, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 437, 446-49 (2019) (discussing FOIA’s limitations in when
government privatizes or works with private actors); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the
Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 894–97 (2014) (examining the problem facing efforts to apply the
APA and FOIA to hybrid, “boundary” agencies).
88. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment provides
no general “right of access to all sources of information within government control”); see generally
Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 76, at 641–43 (identifying limited federal constitutional rights of
access to information and the variability of rights created by state constitutions).
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In sum, transparency in the U.S. and elsewhere has proven difficult to
legislate and enforce.89 Its imposition has required complex laws that
parse fine distinctions in order to balance competing interests. Attorneys
and professionals have developed special expertise for those representing
the public and government.90 Officials who oversee government records
receive compliance training,91 and some statutes excuse agencies from
fee-shifting provisions if they acted in good faith in implementing a
complex, often ambiguous statute.92 Legislators, officials, attorneys, and
courts must resolve the highly technical questions these laws and their
interpretations create.93 Transparency is imposed at a level far removed
from the eyes and ears of the public, in government and legal offices and
89. See generally WORTHY, supra note 72, at 12-14 (describing the clash between transparency’s
symbolic value and the institutions that the implementing laws affect).
90. Although numerous websites, including the federal government’s own FOIA.gov, assist
laypersons in filing an initial request, the process becomes increasingly complex when an agency denies
a request either in part of whole. A how-to guide produced and posted on the Internet by the National
Security Archive (an NGO that extensively uses FOIA) warns that as a requester moves through the
administrative appeals process following a full or partial denial from an agency, it will need an increasing
amount of legal knowledge and should seek representation if she decides to file suit. NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE,
EFFECTIVE
FOIA
REQUESTING
FOR
EVERYONE
29–51
(2008),
available
at
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nsa/foia/foia_guide/foia_guide_full.pdf; see also id. at 52 (“Bringing a
lawsuit requires a commitment of time and resources. . . . Although you may litigate a case without an
attorney, it may be difficult to make an impact on your own if you are not familiar with case law and court
procedures.). FOIA litigation requires attorneys themselves to develop special expertise. For example,
courts have developed special rules to assist them in ruling on summary judgment motions in FOIA
litigation. See Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining rules
developed in response to the “peculiar nature of the FOIA”); cf. Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of
Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 227 (2011) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing law and
fact issues in FOIA litigation and complaining that courts regularly decide FOIA cases on summary
judgment, using the procedure they have developed, despite the dominance of contested fact questions in
their decision).
91. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(j), (j)(2)(F) (2018) (requiring federal agencies to create a “Chief
FOIA Officer” and mandating that the official “offer training” to personnel regarding their duties under
FOIA); A RIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1376.01(a) (2019) (establishing ombudsman to help train agencies
on their responsibilities under state public access law).
92. See Heath Hooper & Charles N. Davis, A Tiger with No Teeth: The Case for Fee Shifting in
State Public Records Law, 79 MO. L. REV. 949, 959–63 (2014).
93. Examples of the narrow, highly technical legal issues that consume FOIA practitioners include
two of the Supreme Court’s most recent FOIA decisions, in which the Court reversed longstanding circuit
court interpretations of two different disclosure exemptions. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,
139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (overruling the D.C. Circuit’s longstanding, influential interpretation of
“privileged or confidential” in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) from National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton,
498 F.2d 765, 767 (1974)); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 570-71 (2011) (overruling the D.C.
Circuit’s longstanding, influential interpretation of “personnel” in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) from Crooker v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
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in courtrooms, as a specialized, complex, internal project led by speciallytrained experts.
The extent of these mandates’ impacts proves difficult to judge, given
the abstract goals that the norm is intended to meet and the challenge of
measuring its benefits and costs. As a public administration scholar who
specializes in transparency has recently noted, its impact will at best prove
“gradual, indirect, and diffuse.”94 This is especially true given both the
difficulty in evaluating the causal effects of a broad administrative norm
imposed by narrowly applied, technical legal mandates,95 and the hazy,
uneven relationship between transparency and government
accountability.96 Moreover, some studies have found evidence that
transparency can demoralize the public as much as it leads them to
participate knowledgeably in democratic elections.97 Critics have more
recently argued that open government laws have been crippled by
underfunding and insufficient compliance98 and that transparency has
been turned into a corporatist anti-regulatory tool.99 One prominent legal
academic has even argued that FOIA has come to constitute a fetish object

94. Gregory Michener, Gauging the Impact of Transparency Policies, 79 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 136
(2019) [hereinafter Michener, Gauging the Impact].
95. See Maria Cuccinello et al., 25 Years of Transparency Research: Evidence and Future
Directions, 77 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 32 (2017); see also Jenny De Fine Licht et al., When Does Transparency
Generate Legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context‐Bound Relationship, 27 GOVERNANCE 111 (2014)
(noting the important role that political and administrative context plays in the impact of transparency
policies on institutional legitimacy).
96. See Jonathan Fox, The Uncertain Relationship Between Transparency and Accountability, 17
DEV. IN PRAC. 663, 668-69 (2007).
97. See, e.g., Monika Bauhr & Marcia Grimes, Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of
Transparency for Societal Accountability, 27 GOVERNANCE 291, 309-11 (2014) (noting that under certain
conditions, exposure of corruption can lead the public to despair rather than to hold state actors
accountable); see generally BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL
REFORM QUANDARY 67 (2015) (arguing that transparency can undercut trust in electoral democracy).
98. See generally Margaret Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016) (showing how use of
FOIA by for-profit requesters crowds out more traditional and intended requests); Pozen, Freedom, supra
note 2, at 1124–25 (discussing congressional underfunding of agency compliance efforts); Daxton R.
“Chip” Stewart & Charles N. Davis, Bringing Back Full Disclosure: A Call for Dismantling FOIA, 21
COMM. L. & POL’Y 515, 517–18 (2016) (characterizing FOIA as “petrified” and “a tool for preserving
secrecy”).
99. See Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 123–46; Jeannine E. Relly & Carol B. Schwalbe, How
business lobby networks shaped the U.S. Freedom of Information Act: An examination of 60 years of
congressional testimony, 33 GOV. INFO. Q. 404 (2016).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2

2021]

POPULISM AND TRANSPARENCY

305

that clogs rather than assists in executive branch administration.100 No
matter the extent of critique of the general concept and its technocratic
mandate, transparency viewed this way attempts to marginally increase
the state’s visibility through intermittently effective regulations on
government behavior.101
B. Political Transparency: Open Government as a Political Norm

Although an administrative and technocratic norm, transparency is
also deployed politically, and in that guise is made to speak in a distinct
register. Candidates, parties, and elected officials use both their
opponents’ alleged secrecy and the threat of exposure to their political
advantage.102 Legislatures enact open government laws for political
gain, whether as part of interparty or interbranch competition.103
Political parties and officials tend to embrace open government laws
when out of power (although they resist enforcement or downplay the
laws’ importance once in office).104 Thus even the most seemingly
neutral good-government laws develop in a partisan context and
require political support for their enactment. At the same time,
presumptively non-partisan, apolitical civil society groups—including
the press and non-governmental organizations—engage in political
campaigns on transparency’s behalf by promoting and lobbying on

100. See Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2019). Some question
whether transparency should play any significant role in government administration. See FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 506-08 (2014).
101. See generally Michener, Gauging the Impact, supra note 93, at 139 (calling for scholars and
funders to concede that, and to develop methodological approaches for evaluation that can better capture
transparency’s marginal impacts).
102. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 22 (noting Trump’s criticism of Hillary Clinton during
2016 campaign); FENSTER, supra note 22, at 6–7 (noting Obama’s criticism of his predecessor’s secrecy
practices during 2008 campaign).
103. See Daniel Berliner, The Political Origins of Transparency, 76 J. POL. 479 (2014); Gregory
Michener, How Cabinet Size and Legislative Control Shape the Strength of Transparency Laws,
28 GOVERNANCE 77 (2015); Sabina Schnell, Cheap talk or incredible commitment? (Mis)calculating
Transparency and Anticorruption, 31 GOVERNANCE 415 (2017).
104. See FENSTER, supra note 22, at 72–73. The same political dynamic has played a role in the
enactment and amendment of administrative laws more generally. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV.
1557 (1996); McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 180 (1999).
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behalf of open government laws.105
Within this political context, open government laws come draped in
powerfully symbolic language that make the laws appear to transcend
politics. These laws proclaim their importance in titles that promise a
tangible, visible state which is directly answerable to its public.106
Proponents declare the laws will provide “sunshine” or sunlight to an
otherwise darkened bureaucracy,107 “free” government information
from official clutches,108 and grant the public a “right to know” the
government and its actions.109 To make the case for transparency,
advocates regularly invoke Louis Brandeis’s famous dictum about
sunlight’s power as a disinfectant.110 In the words of the Sunlight

105. Histories of open government legislation and its implementation highlight the political nature
of transparency laws. See, e.g., SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE PARADOX OF PRESS
FREEDOM IN THE AMERICA 164-89 (2016) (focusing on the U.S.), SCHUDSON, supra note 70, at 4 (same);
SHARMA, supra note 72 (India); WORTHY, supra note 72 (U.K.); Fabrizio Di Mascio et al., The Political
Origins of Transparency Reform: Insights from the Italian Case, ITALIAN POL. SCI. REV. (forthcoming,
published online 2018), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/italian-political-science-review-rivistaitaliana-di-scienza-politica/article/political-origins-of-transparency-reform-insights-from-the-italiancase/06B8491B3F62EAAEBD47DA97169293D4. For descriptions of the role that NGOs have played,
see generally Daniel Berliner, Transnational Advocacy and Domestic Law: International NGOs and the
Design of Freedom of Information Laws, 11 REV. INT. ORGAN. 121 (2016); Mark Fenster, The
Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U.
PITT. L. REV. 443, 451–66 (2012); Milton Mueller et al., Civil Society and the Shaping of Communication–
Information Policy: Four Decades of Advocacy, 20 INFO. SOC’Y 169 (2004).
106. On the recurring use of “sunshine” and “freedom” as metaphors in open government law and
the importance of such symbolism to transparency advocacy, see FENSTER, supra note 22, at 3-6.
107. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 39 U.S.C.); Open Government—The “Sunshine” Law, OFF.
ATT’Y
GEN.
ASHLEY
MOODY,
https://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/Main/DC0B20B7DC22B7418525791B006A54E4 (last visited
Aug. 18, 2019) (referring colloquially to Florida’s open government laws as “sunshine laws”); Louis D.
Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10 (“Publicity is justly commended
as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”).
108. See generally FENSTER, supra note 22, at 27–29 (on the origins of the term “freedom of
information” among U.S. advocates); see, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
109. See generally FENSTER, supra note 21, at 28–30 (on the origins of the term “right to know”
among U.S. transparency advocates); see, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to . . . seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers”); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001–50 (1994) (requiring firms and individuals to report to state and local
governments the quantities of potentially hazardous chemicals that have been stored or released into the
environment).
110. For examples of the many uses of Justice Brandeis’s metaphor, see Fenster, Seeing the State,
supra note 76, at 626 n.28. On Justice Brandeis’s work, see Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 108–10.
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Foundation, an influential Washington, D.C.-based NGO focused on
transparency that closed in September 2020, “We believe that
information is power, or, to put it more finely, disproportionate access
to information is power. We are committed to improving public access
to public information by making it available to the public, online.”111
Calaware, an NGO focused on advocating open government in
California, describes its mission as helping to enforce “people’s rights
to find out what citizens need to know to be truly self-governing” and
fighting “excessive official secrecy” and “intimidation or retaliation”
against those who inquire about or report government actions.112
Advocates deploy vivid political arguments about transparency in
hopes of persuading others of transparency’s status as an essential
democratic norm.
C. Transparency Against the State: Open Government as a Populist
Norm

The politics of transparency are rooted in populism’s understanding
of state power. Advocates invoke populism’s dualist view of the state
and public113 by promising individual and collective self-rule that
would allow the people to act in a responsible and informed manner in
order to check a secretive, possibly corrupt state whose officers
constitute an elite and secretly act on others’ behalf to advance narrow
interests.114 As an ideal, transparency springs not only from an
affirmative embrace of deliberative democratic ideals, but also from a
fear of concentrated power and of government venality, as well as from

111. Our Mission, SUNLIGHT FOUND., https://sunlightfoundation.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 29,
2019).
112. Our Mission, CALIFORNIANS AWARE, https://www.calaware.org/about/our-mission/ (last
visited Aug. 29, 2019).
113. See supra Part I-A.
114. See, e.g., Introduction to the Open Government Guide, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (last visited Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.rcfp.org/introduction-to-the-opengovernment-guide/ (connecting transparency to participatory democracy); Memorandum for the
Establishment of a Freedom of Information Advocates Network, FOIANET (Sept. 28, 2002),
http://foiadvocates.net/wp-content/uploads/FOIANet_Memorandum_28_09_2002_EN.doc
(declaring
that transparency and the availability of information on issues of public interest are “fundamental preconditions for public participation”).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/2

22

Fenster: Populism and Transparency

308

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89

the public distrust that results from secret power’s excesses.115
In addition, transparency promises to create and mobilize a popular
will, guaranteeing a more direct, authentic, and populist relationship
between the public and those who would represent and lead it.116 Like
a populist movement or leader, or in conjunction with one,
transparency promises to remove the distance between the public
(“we”) and the state by putting an informed public back in charge—a
public that can truly know its leadership through the flow of
information. The National Freedom of Information Coalition, a group
of national and state-level NGOs that advocate for journalists and
freedom of information laws, has declared that its mission is “to foster
transparent state and local government, which in turn leads to
increased civic engagement, self-governance, public-affairs
journalism and civic information, and ultimately a better-informed and
more trustful society and democracy.”117 This new “society and
democracy”—with a more engaged public that is better capable of
governing itself—will support a government that is more trustworthy
and representative. The state’s visibility will make it known rather than
secret, honest rather than corrupt, and authentic rather than deceitful.
As Emmanuel Alloa has argued, transparency promises that “only
where nothing is withheld can things be genuine and subjects true to
themselves.”118 Like populism, transparency imagines creating a
politics of close proximity, where the state communicates directly and
fully with the public and furthers the public’s will.119
And like populism, transparency appears to have no necessary
affiliation with the political left or right. Its roots lay in the progressivism
115. See generally Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 116–22 (summarizing the arguments made on
behalf of the various open government laws enacted from 1966–76).
116. See supra Part I-B.
117. NATIONAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COALITION, 2020 VISION: VISION, MISSION,
STRATEGIES, GOALS, OBJECTIVES FOR 2020 AND BEYOND (Aug. 6, 2019), available at
https://www.nfoic.org/sites/default/files/pages/2019-08/NFOIC%202020%20Vision%20%20ADOPTED%20080619.pdf.
118. Emmanuel Alloa, Transparency: A Magic Concept of Modernity, in TRANSPARENCY, SOCIETY
AND SUBJECTIVITY 21, 32 (Emmanuel Alloa & Dieter Thomä eds., 2018); see also Oana Brindusa Albu
& Mikkel Flyverbom, Organizational Transparency: Conceptualizations, Conditions, and Consequences,
58 BUS. & SOC’Y 268, 276 (2019) (transparency allows the public to access “authentic reality that is
considered to be pre-existing and independent of the representations produced in the name of
transparency”).
119. See supra Part I-C.
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of the early twentieth century, especially as that tradition developed in
support of the midcentury expansion of the administrative state. 120 The
promises of transparency advocates have echoed earlier efforts to reform
the modern state during the so-called Populist and Progressive eras that
sought to expand popular control over the U.S. federal and sub-federal
government.121 Over the past several decades, civil society watchdogs
have continued to emphasize transparency as part of more longstanding
“good-government battles” to protect and expand the public’s input into
elections and government accountability.122 Nevertheless, as David Pozen
has argued, transparency advocacy has not solely been the province of the
progressive and populist left, having drifted recently in a more
conservative and libertarian direction. Corporate interests have more
widely used open government laws and congressional rules as part of their
efforts to oppose legislatures and administrative agencies that would
regulate them, and as lawmakers and administrators have replaced
command and control regulatory programs with disclosure-based
regulations.123 Pozen has critiqued transparency as a “relatively empty
concept, normatively, in the absence of a stable political referent”124
whose meaning and influence is altered by shifts in “culture, technology,
demography, political organization, and so on [that] will invariably alter
its social and semiotic significance.”125 Transparency’s vacuity, he
argues, leaves the concept vulnerable to use by interests inimical to its
progressive roots, and renders it suspect as a political tool on which
progressives can confidently rely.
But like populism, transparency does not become an empty concept or
120. On transparency’s direct and indirect relationship to progressivism, see Pozen, Drift, supra
note 71, at 108–22; see generally Joanna Grisinger, The (Long) Administrative Century: Progressive
Models of Governance, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT, AND THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 360, 368, 374–75 (Stephen Skowronek et al.
eds., 2016) (placing the APA and the open government statutes within the history of progressive
governance).
121. On progressivism generally, see MORONE, supra note 31, at 5–9; ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877–1920, at 164–85 (1967).
122. See Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 117–22.
123. Id. at 124–41.
124. Id. at 151 n.231; see also id. at 104 (characterizing transparency as a “protean concept that
may be invoked in a wide range of settings for a wide range of ends”).
125. Id. at 106; see also id. at 104 n.9 (characterizing transparency’s political valence as resulting
from “the interactions over time between various legal instantiations of transparency and various political
actors seeking to access or control information”).
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administrative norm simply because of its uptake and use by a variety of
political movements. Transparency also rests on a theory of power and of
the state. Indeed, since its beginnings in the Progressive Era,126 the
reaction to the expansion of government secrecy which led the press to
initiate its campaign for open government, and popular discontent
following the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and President
Nixon’s resignation,127 transparency has been defined in part by its roots
in populist discontent with the state and with the state’s detached
relationship to the public. A freer flow of information, along with a
concrete right to challenge officials’ unwillingness to disclose, promises
to restore the state to its position as an instrument of the public’s will,
capable of accurately furthering the public’s interest. This view of state
power is constitutive of transparency’s understanding of democratic
governance and of disclosure’s consequences, even as it stands ready for
appropriation by political movements of all types. Populism’s core claim
about a secret power bloc serves as an important source for the
charismatic authority that transparency can claim as an administrative
norm. This Article discusses the important differences between
transparency and populism in Part IV after identifying how their
continuities have allowed contemporary populists like Donald Trump to
claim—plausibly, to his supporters—that he governed transparently even
when he was clearly less transparent than the technocratic rules and norms
which implement the concept require.
IV. TRANSPARENCY IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
Nearly midway through his term, President Trump tweeted a complaint
about the long-delayed report from the Department of Justice’s Inspector
General on FBI Director James Comey’s handling of the controversy
surrounding Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server while she was
Secretary of State during the Obama administration:128 “There are so
126. Id. at 106.
127. See Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive
Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 254 (2008).
128. A general report about the FBI’s performance was issued a week after the tweet. See OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW DIVISION 18-04, A
REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
IN
ADVANCE
OF
THE
2016
ELECTION
(June
2018),
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/file/1071991/download. On the controversy surrounding Clinton’s emails, see
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many horrible things to tell, the public has the right to know.
Transparency!”129 This was neither the first nor final time he used
“transparency” or “transparent” in a presidential tweet, and he began
using both terms before the 2016 presidential campaign.130 During his
time in office, President Trump often characterized himself as the “most
transparent” president in history,131 going so far as to hold open in the
interest of “transparency” a high-stakes meeting with congressional
leaders over ending a shutdown of the federal government. 132 When
asked, Trump supporters tended to agree with his self-assessment.133

Joshua Jacobson, Note, The Secretary's Emails: The Intersection of Transparency, Security, and
Technology, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1441 (2016).
129. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2018, 6:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1003949263481696256.
130. As of late August 2020, Trump’s account had tweeted or re-tweeted the words “transparency”
or “transparent” thirty-eight times (twenty-six times since his January 20, 2017, inauguration). See TRUMP
TWITTER ARCHIVE, http://trumptwitterarchive.com/archive (last visited Aug. 26, 2020). He frequently
used the terms as part of his campaign to question President Obama’s birthplace. See, e.g., Donald J.
Trump,
Donald
Trump
Responds,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
8,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/opinion/lweb08trump.html (criticizing President Obama for failing
to produce a birth certificate); see generally Michael Barkun, President Trump and the “Fringe,” 29
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 437, 438–39, 442 n.5 (2017).
131. See Louis Jacobson, Is Donald Trump the Most Transparent President Ever? NO, POLITIFACT
(June 4, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2019/jun/04/donald-trump/trump-administrationmost-transparent-ever-no/ (“Time and again, President Donald Trump has asserted that his administration
has achieved championship-level transparency.”). Trump publicly pronounced the claim at least three
separate times in April and May 2019. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, Remarks Before Marine
One Departure (May 24, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-44/); Doyle McManus, The Most Transparent
President Ever (Not), L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-poltrump-transparent-accountable-20190501-story.html; Andrew Restuccia, Trump's 'Most Transparent
President'
Claim
Looks
Cloudy,
POLITICO
(May
23,
2019,
6:45
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/23/trumps-transparency-1342875.
132. See Matt Lewis, Everybody’s Wrong: Donald Trump Won the Chuck-n-Nancy Meeting, and
Here’s Why, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/everybodys-wrong-donaldtrump-won-the-chuck-n-nancy-meeting-and-heres-why; Transcript of the Heated Meeting Between
Trump,
Pelosi
and
Schumer,
MARKETWATCH
(Dec.
11,
2018),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/transcript-of-the-heated-exchange-between-trump-pelosi-andschumer-2018-12-11 (quoting Trump to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi characterizing the meeting, “It's
called transparency.”).
133. Dave Taylor, Pulse of the Voters: ‘Transparency’ Appeals to GOP Fan Bendsza, TRIBUNE
STAR (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.tribstar.com/news/local_news/pulse-of-the-voters-transparencyappeals-to-gop-fan-bendzsa/article_6f73f8de-6bc6-5955-996b-d9f27213b02a.html
(quoting
interviewee’s description of Trump as “the most transparent president ever”); Ian Schwartz, CNN Focus
Group of Trump Voters: “Exactly What I Voted For”, REALCLEAR POLITICS (Feb. 13, 2018),
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This Part evaluates President Trump’s and his supporters’ claims. The
Trump administration did not make the federal bureaucracy more visible
in a technical sense. No one should be surprised by this. In his private
career, Trump frequently threatened reprisal and litigation against anyone
who exposed his business practices, 134 and his apparent distaste for the
First Amendment rights of his critics 135 as well as his penchant for
controlling information about himself136 suggested that his administration
would not be as compliant with the letter or spirit of open government
laws as those that came before. The first section considers how well his
administration fulfilled the public’s “right to know” and furthered
government transparency in a traditional sense: by complying with legal
mandates in disclosure and administrative laws, with congressional
demands for information, and with the less-formal norms by which
elected officials and candidates have released information. It finds that
the administration largely, and in some respects completely, failed
effectively to do so. The second section considers the alternative
understanding that Trump and his supporters have given to the concept of
transparency. Given his penchant for lying, Trump’s claim to have been
a transparent president could simply be dismissed, as could the views of
his supporters who seemed not to have noticed or cared about the lack of

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/02/13/cnn_focus_group_of_trump_voters_exactly_what_i
_voted_for.html (quoting a voter: “He’s very transparent. He’s open.”).
134. See Adam Davidson, Trump’s Business of Corruption, NEW YORKER (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/trumps-business-of-corruption; Zoe Tillman, Donald
Trump Has Used A Secretive Justice System to Keep Lawsuits Against Him out of Court, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Aug. 8, 2019, 8:36 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/donald-trump-lawsuitssecret-arbitration.
135. RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Making an Enemy of the Press, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV.
ONLINE:
TRUMP
100
DAYS
(Apr.
29.
2017),
available
at
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/making-an-enemy-of-the-press/; Neil Richards,
Free Speech and the Twitter Presidency, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE: TRUMP 100 DAYS (Apr. 29. 2017),
available
at
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/free-speech-and-the-twitterpresidency/; Sonja R. West, Presidential Attacks on the Press, 83 MO. L. REV. 915, 917–33 (2018).
136. See Josh Dawsey & Ashley Parker, ‘Everyone Signed One’: Trump Is Aggressive in His Use
of Nondisclosure Agreements, Even in Government, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://beta.washingtonpost.com/politics/everyone-signed-one-trump-is-aggressive-in-his-use-ofnondisclosure-agreements-even-in-government/2018/08/13/9d0315ba-9f15-11e8-93e324d1703d2a7a_story.html; Mark Fenster, Revealing Secrecy Tools, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 11,
2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/revealing-secrecy-tools/; Orly Lobel, Trump’s Extreme NDAs,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/trumps-use-ndasunprecedented/583984/.
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empirical support for Trump’s claims.137 But even if justified, dismissing
Trump’s claim misses the particular idea of transparency that the claim
embraces, one that was most clearly on display in the open-ended and
seemingly improvisational “real” communication of his voice and
perspective via social media and political rallies.
A. Compliance with Transparency-Related Laws and Norms
1. Documentary Disclosure and Open Data
The most prevalent way that transparency is understood and measured
is through documentary disclosure, which U.S. federal law mandates in
FOIA.138 The extent of any administration’s compliance with FOIA
mandates is difficult to gauge, given the vast number of requests made of
hundreds of administrative agencies across the federal government and
the disparate response to legislative commands and executive control.139
Nevertheless, the Trump administration did not fulfill its FOIA
obligations as well as its predecessor.140 One analysis found that the
Trump administration censored, withheld, or claimed it could not find

137. See In 928 Days, President Trump Has Made 12,019 False or Misleading Claims¸ WASH.
POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/ (last visited Aug. 29,
2019) (finding that as of August 5, 2019, President Trump had made 12,019 false or misleading claims in
less than three years). He falsely claimed to be the most transparent president in history at least thirteen
times. See id.
138. See Pozen, Freedom, supra note 2, at 1105-06 (noting FOIA’s centrality as a global model for
transparency).
139. See Lauren Harper, Nate Jones & Tom Blanton, Three out of Five Federal Agencies Flout New
FOIA Law, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (Mar. 11, 2017), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news-foiaaudit/foia/2017-03-11/three-out-five-federal-agencies-flout-new-foia-law (finding that a majority of
federal agencies failed to comply with requirements established in FOIA amendment); NATIONAL
SECURITY ARCHIVE, SUNSHINE AND SHADOWS: THE CLEAR OBAMA MESSAGE FOR FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION
MEETS
MIXED
RESULTS
(Mar.
15,
2010),
available
at
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB308/2010FOIAAudit.pdf (finding disparate agency
response to memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder announcing Obama Administration’s more
requester-friendly approach to FOIA compliance).
140. See Courtney Buble, Transparency in the Trump Era, GOV. EXEC. (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/03/transparency-trump-era/163574/; Thomas C. Ellington,
Transparency Under Trump: Policy and Prospects, 29 PUB. INTEG. 127 (2019); How Transparent is
President Trump? Audit Shows Three-Quarters of His Decisions Have Been Bad for Openness, NAT’L
SECRUITY ARCHIVE (Mar. 12, 2020), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/foia-audit/foia/2020-03-13 (March 12,
2020).
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requested records at a higher rate than the Obama administration. 141 The
number of lawsuits filed against the federal government for alleged noncompliance steadily rose after Trump’s inauguration, especially against
top executive branch agencies like the Department of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security, exceeding the number of suits filed
against previous administrations.142 An increase in lawsuits challenging
agencies’ failures to respond at all to requests accounts for most of this
increase,143 as FOIA litigation contributes to lengthier legal disputes.144
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), which prominently
pursued the Trump administration’s deregulatory agenda, proved
especially resistant to FOIA requests.145 At the same time, the
administration brazenly refused to comply with the record-retention
141. Associated Press, Federal Government Sets New Record for Censoring, Withholding Files
Under FOIA, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/foia-federalgovernment-sets-new-record-for-censoring-withholding-files-trump-administration/; see also Michael
Morisy, Under Trump, a Strained FOIA Continues to Show Its Seams, MUCKROCK (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2018/jan/25/trump-foia-one-year-later/ (complaining about
lack of FOIA compliance during first year of Trump Administration); The Limits of Transparency and
FOIA
Under
Trump,
FIRST
AMENDMENT
WATCH
(Mar.
14,
2018),
https://firstamendmentwatch.org/limits-transparency-foia-trump/ (collecting links and stories
complaining about Trump Administration noncompliance).
142. See Christine Mehta, Annual Report: FOIA Lawsuits Reach Record Highs in FY 2018, THE
FOIA PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/11/12/annual-report-foia-lawsuits-reachrecord-highs-in-fy-2018/ (finding that the rate of filing lawsuits had more than doubled during Fiscal
Years 2017 and 2018 compared to the annual number of suits filed during the Obama Administration);
see also FOIA Project Staff, October 2019 FOIA Litigation with Five-Year Monthly Trends, THE FOIA
PROJECT (Nov. 19, 2019), http://foiaproject.org/2019/11/19/october-2019-foia-litigation-with-five-yearmonthly-trends/ (finding that FOIA lawsuit filings continued to show rise during Trump Administration).
Filers included media organizations and nongovernmental organizations. See FOIA Project Staff, Media
Lawsuits Seeking Government Records Jump Under Trump, THE FOIA PROJECT (Aug. 2, 2018),
http://foiaproject.org/2018/08/02/media-foia-lawsuits-jump-under-trump/; FOIA Project Staff, FOIA
Suits Filed by Nonprofit/Advocacy Groups Have Doubled Under Trump, THE FOIA PROJECT (Oct. 18,
2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/10/18/nonprofit-advocacy-groups-foia-suits-double-under-trump/.
143. See FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Lawsuits Are Taking Longer To Resolve, THE FOIA PROJECT
(Jan. 23, 2020), http://foiaproject.org/2020/01/23/lawsuits-annual-2019/.
144. See FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Suits Rise Because Agencies Don’t Respond Even as Requesters
Wait Longer to File Suit, THE FOIA PROJECT (Dec. 15, 2019), http://foiaproject.org/2019/12/15/foiasuits-rise-because-agencies-dont-respond-even-as-requesters-wait-longer-to-file-suit/.
145. See Brie D. Sherwin, The Upside Down: A New Reality for Science at the EPA and Its Impact
on Environmental Justice, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 98–99 (2019); Emily Holden, Anti-Secrecy Lawsuits
Soaring
Against
Pruitt’s
EPA,
POLITICO
(Feb.
26,
2018,
5:01
AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/26/pruitt-epa-secrecy-lawsuits-environment-355842;
Bryan
Koenig, Can Courts Handle the Increased FOIA Strain Under Trump?, LAW360 (Feb. 16, 2018, 8:06
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1013602.
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requirements of the Presidential Records Act (“PRA”):146 Trump tore up
paper documents,147 avoided whenever possible having notes written
before and after meetings with foreign leaders, 148 White House officials
communicated with private, encrypted message applications rather than
their official government email accounts, 149 and the administration put
political appointees rather than civil servants in charge of PRA
compliance.150
The Trump administration also retreated from its predecessor’s open
data initiative, in which federal agencies release to the public
“government information that can be universally and readily accessed,
used, and redistributed free of charge in digital and machine-readable
form.”151 The initiative’s purpose was to enable the public to access
information on agency performance and to allow private entities to make
use of and profit from data the government collects.152 Beginning soon
146. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. (2018).
147. See Annie Karnie, Meet the Guys Who Tape Trump's Papers Back Together, POLITICO (June
10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/10/trump-papers-filing-system-635164.
148. See Greg Miller, Trump Has Concealed Details of His Face-to-Face Encounters with Putin
from
Senior
Officials
in
Administration,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
13,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-has-concealed-details-of-his-face-toface-encounters-with-putin-from-senior-officials-in-administration/2019/01/12/65f6686c-1434-11e9b6ad-9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html; Annie Karnie, Meet the Guys Who Tape Trump's Papers Back Together,
POLITICO (June 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/10/trump-papers-filing-system635164.
149. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 924 F.3d 602, 609 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (holding that the Presidential Records Act does not authorize issue of writ of mandamus to
challenge White House officials’ use of encrypted message app that automatically deleted messages once
read in order to avoid creating records); Kel McClanahan, Trump and the Demise of the Presidential
Records
Honor
System,
JUST
SECURITY
BLOG
(Mar.
22,
2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/63348/trump-and-the-demise-of-the-presidential-records-honor-system/.
150. See Alexi McCammond, Scoop: Cyber memo warns of new risks to White House network,
AXIOS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.axios.com/exclusive-white-house-cyber-memo-warns-of-newnetwork-risks-9aa19c6c-77a3-485b-919b-1dd9bd691514.html; Marcy Wheeler, White House Putting
Political Employees in Charge of Presidential Records Act Compliance, EMPTYWHEEL (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.emptywheel.net/2019/10/23/white-house-putting-political-employees-in-charge-ofpresidential-records-act-compliance/.
151. Beth Simone Noveck, Open Data: The Future of Transparency in the Age of Big Data, in
TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 206, 208 (David
E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018); see also Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies: Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009)
(issued immediately following Obama’s inauguration and committing to release on a public website
“high-value data sets” in an “open format”).
152. See Cass R. Sunstein, Output Transparency vs. Input Transparency, in TROUBLING
TRANSPARENCY, supra note 150, at 187, 190–92.
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after Trump’s inauguration, the administration removed, manipulated,
and censored data that had been available on agency websites and the
data.gov portal that the Obama administration initiated. 153 By reducing
the quantity and availability of this data, as well as efforts to develop
innovative programs and policies,154 the Trump administration did not
meet the standard of transparency set by the previous administration.
Although significant, the Trump administration’s departure appeared
incremental rather than radical or disruptive.155 The Obama
administration may have met its FOIA obligations more effectively than
its successor, but transparency advocates frequently complained about its
failure to respond to FOIA requests from journalists and public interest
organizations,156 and argued that it had prioritized the release of open data

153. See Nathan Cortez, Information Mischief Under the Trump Administration, 94 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 315, 324–35 (2019); see generally Web Integrity Project, SUNLIGHT FOUND.,
https://sunlightfoundation.com/web-integrity-project/ (last visited July 10, 2019) (publicizing efforts to
“monitor changes to government websites, holding our government accountable by revealing shifts in
public information and access to Web resources, as well as changes in stated policies and priorities”).
154. For example, the Trump administration’s National Action Plan for Open Government, which
was delayed prior to release, merely compiled and listed existing open data programs rather than
announced new ones, as had previous reports. See Jessie Bur, New open government plan doubles down
on
old
priorities,
FED.
TIMES
(Feb.
25,
2019),
https://www.federaltimes.com/management/2019/02/25/new-open-government-plan-doubles-down-onold-priorities/; Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, U.S. finally submits fourth National Action Plan for Open
Government, FEDSCOOP (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.fedscoop.com/national-action-plan-opengovernment-2019/.
155. See generally Koenig, supra note 144 (describing increase in FOIA requests and litigation
since Trump’s inauguration, noting that his administration had been less responsive and open than its
predecessor, but not characterizing Trump Administration as uniquely or radically disruptive).
156. Transparency advocates were disappointed in the failure of Obama’s administration to live up
to the President’s stated commitment to transparency. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer, Government Secrecy in the
Age of Information Overload, SHORENSTEIN CENTER ON MEDIA, POL. & PUB. POL’Y (Nov. 6, 2017, 10:40
AM), https://shorensteincenter.org/jameel-jaffer-salant-lecture-2017/; Daniel J. Metcalfe, From FOIA
Service to Lip Service: The Unexpected Story of White House Visitor Logs, 36 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS
3, 3 (Spring 2011) (expressing disappointment at Obama Administration’s resistance to releasing White
House visitor logs); John Wonderlich, Obama's DOJ Seeks to Weaken the FOIA, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct.
28, 2011, 5:36 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2011/10/28/obamas-doj-seeks-to-weaken-the-foia/.
Scholars shared advocates’ disappointment. See Derek E. Bambauer, Chutzpah, 6 J. NAT'L SECURITY L.
& POL'Y 549, 561 (2013); Heidi Kitrosser, “Trust Me” and Transparency Do Not Mix, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV.
ONLINE:
TRUMP
100
DAYS
(Apr.
29,
2017),
available
at
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/trust-me-and-transparency-do-not-mix/; Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An Essay on the Obama
Administration, Google Government, and the Difficulties of Securing Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 449, 467 (2011); Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government
in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 90 (2012).
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over responding to FOIA record requests.157 While the increase in recent
legal challenges under FOIA to Trump administration agencies’
disclosure denials likely suggests agencies’ willingness to delay and
oppose disclosure, it may also have reflected ideological opposition on
the part of private litigants158 to the administration’s efforts to remove
federal regulations imposed under the previous administration.159 The
Trump administration’s higher degree of non-compliance and the
increased levels of litigation it faced were not so high as to reflect a
universal, coordinated effort to flout FOIA and were not inconsistent with
the tendency among Republican administrations to take a less disclosurefriendly approach to FOIA than Democratic ones. 160

157. See Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open
Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 534–35, 539–41 (2009); J.B. Wogan, Obama's transparency record:
lots of data, not as much sunlight, POLITIFACT (July 16, 2012), https://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2012/jul/16/obama-report-card-transparency-sunlight/. Key members of the Obama
administration considered the open data initiative to be more significant for open government than FOIA
compliance. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 151, at 188 (former director of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs under Obama arguing that the “output transparency” released under the open data
initiative has a stronger justification than the “input transparency” established by FOIA); Beth Simone
Noveck, Is Open Data the Death of FOIA?, YALE L.J. FORUM 273, 274 (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/NoveckFinal_xjaur4gj.pdf (former United States deputy chief
technology officer for open government who led Obama Administration’s Open Government Initiative
arguing that “open data’s more systematic and collaborative approach represents a radical and welcome
departure from FOIA because open data concentrates on information as a means to solve problems to the
end of improving government effectiveness”).
158. See Ethan Barton, Liberal Activists Are Bombarding Trump with New FOIA Lawsuits, DAILY
CALLER (May 31, 2017, 9:08 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/05/31/liberal-activists-are-bombardingtrump-with-new-foia-lawsuits.
159. KEITH H. BELTON & JOHN D. GRAHAM, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FOUND. CENTER. FOR
POL’Y RES., TRUMP’S DEREGULATORY RECORD: AN ASSESSMENT AT THE TWO-YEAR MARK 5 (Mar.
2019), available at http://accf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ACCF-Report_Trump-DeregulatoryRecord-FINAL.pdf; (characterizing Trump’s campaign for office as promising “widespread deregulation
of the US economy” and concluding that after two years he had “followed through with an aggressive
program of deregulation”); William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency
in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1358, 1376 (2018) (“As of mid-2018, policy change orders,
directives, proposals, or actions have overwhelmingly been in a deregulatory direction.”).
160. Compare, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Heads of All Federal
Departments and Agencies on the Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), available at
https://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/011012.htm (George W. Bush Administration Attorney General
advising that, “When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or
in part, you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a
sound legal basis”), with Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Executive Departments
and
Agencies
(Mar.
19,
2009),
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009.pdf
(Obama
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2. Administrative Procedures
In their efforts to remove or reduce existing regulatory mandates while
creating new mandates relating to immigration, the Trump administration
often circumvented the legally-required processes that, at least in theory,
make agencies’ quasi-legislative, administrative rulemaking transparent
to the public—one of the key rationales for the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”).161 During Trump’s term, courts often reversed many of
these agencies’ efforts.162 One academic otherwise sympathetic to at least
some of the administration’s substantive deregulatory goals characterized
the Trump EPA’s record as “poor” and “unenviable,” and the product of
a staff that lacked “experienced policy hands with the knowledge and
expertise to navigate the administrative process.”163 Less sympathetic
scholars characterized the administration’s process (or lack thereof) as
“regulatory slop”—reflecting purposeful disregard for well-established
requirements to engage with the public in the rulemaking process,
insufficient care about whether their efforts are procedurally permissible,
and a generalized failure to execute laws faithfully to statutes and the
Constitution.164
Administration Attorney General withdrawing Ashcroft memorandum and announcing “a clear
presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails”).
161. See generally RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 429
(7th ed. 2015) (characterizing administrative rulemaking as “the most visible mode of agency
policymaking”); Martin Shapiro, A Golden Anniversary? The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 19
REG. 40, 42–43 (1996) (describing “transparency and participation” as purposes at the APA’s core).
162. According to one organization that tracked relevant litigation, when challenged, the Trump
Administration’s major deregulatory efforts had been reversed or withdrawn at a rate of more than 85%
as of August 2020. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY,
(Aug. 24, 2020), https://policyintegrity.org/deregulation-roundup; see also Keith B. Belton & John D.
Graham, Trump's Deregulation Record: Is It Working?, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 850-59 (2019) (finding
that that Trump's deregulatory agenda was blocked or delayed by federal courts due to flaws in rulemaking
process). Typically, agencies win the majority of such challenges. See Margot Sanger-Katz, For Trump
Administration, It Has Been Hard to Follow the Rules on Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/upshot/for-trump-administration-it-has-been-hard-to-follow-therules-on-rules.html?login=email&auth=login-email.
163. See Jonathan Adler, Hostile Environment, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 27, 2018, 10:33 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/15/hostile-environment/; see also James P Pfiffner,
The Contemporary Presidency: Organizing the Trump Presidency, 48 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 153, 153
(2018) (describing the dysfunction and absence of regular policy development process in Trump
Administration).
164. Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and
Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1655 (2019); Peter M. Shane, Faithful Nonexecution, 29 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 405, 465-66 (2019) see also Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems
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The Trump administration repeated a particular pattern of disregard for
administrative process several times. It attempted to establish a so-called
“Muslim Ban,” for example, with a rushed Executive Order from the
White House165 following numerous presidential pronouncements
suggesting religious animus as its motivation.166 After the administration
reissued different iterations of the “ban” in response to serial lower court
reversals,167 the Supreme Court finally upheld the third version of the
order on the grounds that the relevant statutory authority “exudes
deference”168 and the executive action fell squarely within a sphere that
the Constitution delegated to presidential action. 169 The Court’s majority
did not consider the troubling process and public pronouncements upon
which the President and his administration relied, 170 granting deference
that the four dissenting justices, in two separate opinions, would not have
given due to the manner in which the ban was put into place.171 More
(So Far) of Trump's Deregulatory Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 15 (2018) (excoriating Trump
administration agencies for displaying “autocracy, impulsivity, and jerry-rigged reasoning”).
165. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978–79 (Jan. 27, 2017).
166. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsideration en banc
denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsideration en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied sub nom. Golden v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 448 (2017) (noting presidential statements
characterizing his intent to impose a Muslim ban); State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1148 n.9 (D.
Haw. 2017), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923
(2018), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (noting presidential tweets characterizing his intent
to impose a Muslim ban).
167. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 756 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), vacated by Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.) (explaining that the President's actions "must be scrutinized with
caution" because they were "incompatible" with the processes and mandates set out by Congress in
statutes (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (noting public statements from the
President and administration figures that would allow “an objective observer [to] conclude that the
primary purpose of the Proclamation [was] to exclude Muslims from the United States”).
168. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018) (holding that the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), “exudes deference to the President in every clause”).
169. Id. at 2409.
170. Id. at 2418, 2423.
171. See id. at 2437–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the entire context of the Executive
Order’s issuance and development should be considered in evaluating its validity); Id. at 2433 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Sotomayor regarding the existing record of bias). In his separate
concurrence, Justice Kennedy expressed disquiet about statements made by government officials during
the process of issuing the third Executive Order. See id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
officials, in their unreviewable statements and actions, should take care not to disregard the Constitution);
see also William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 170 (2019) (noting lower
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recently, the Court held that the Department of Commerce failed to
employ “[r]easoned decisionmaking” under the APA to explain its
inclusion of a question about citizenship in the 2020 Census.172 Multiple
agencies repeatedly sought to deny the statutory authority that prior
administrations claimed in promulgating regulatory rules without meeting
the substantive and procedural requirements in both the APA and
enabling acts.173 Agencies also splintered the steps involved in rolling
back regulations in order to avoid the APA’s requirements to engage in a
new notice and comment rulemaking.174 And the EPA lost a number of
lawsuits as it sought to stay, delay, and ultimately revoke regulations
promulgated by the Obama administration—deregulatory efforts that
were frustrated or deferred because of the agency’s failure to follow
required procedures.175
3. Congressional Investigations
After reclaiming a majority in the 2018 midterm elections, Democrats
in the House of Representatives began to use their control over House
committees to initiate multiple investigations of President Trump and
Executive Branch agencies and officers. Committees issued subpoenas
when the administration and current and former personnel resisted
demands for documents and testimony. 176 The disputes that created the

courts’ willingness to probe the government's motivations to some appreciable degree on the basis of
Trump’s public statements).
172. Dep't of Commerce v. NewYork, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019).
173. See William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE
L.J. 1509, 1591 (2019).
174. See William W. Buzbee, Deregulatory Splintering, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 442 (2019).
175. See William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in
Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1358, 1378 (2018); Heinzerling, supra note 163, at 14; Bethany
Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (noting Trump
Administration’s poor record in attempting to suspend enforcement prior to repealing or promulgating a
new rule). The administration’s tendency to skirt statutory obligations, if not ignore them altogether, was
not limited just to APA rulemaking compliance. See, e.g., El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 655,
856-57(W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding that the President’s proclamation of a national emergency that required
funding support for a U.S.-Mexico border wall was in violation of the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 116–6 (2019) (to be printed at 133 Stat. 13)).
176. See generally Kerry W. Kircher, Trump’s Unprecedented Fight to Withhold Information,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/house-needs-itssubpoena-power-against-trump/596857/ (listing instances of administration resistance to congressional

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

35

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2

2021]

POPULISM AND TRANSPARENCY

321

most conflict included the President’s resistance to submit financial
information and tax returns,177 and the White House’s refusal to allow
current and former officials to testify before House committees. 178
Such conflicts between a President and Congress are longstanding and
occurred during the Obama administration as well. 179 Congress has long
been forced to rely upon its inherent subpoena power to obtain
information from a recalcitrant White House and presidential
administration,180 and it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare the
extent of the Trump administration’s defiance of congressional demands
for information to that of its immediate predecessors.181 Trump, however,
portrayed this interbranch dispute in absolute terms, declaring to reporters
on the White House lawn that, “We’re fighting all the subpoenas,”182
while his White House counsel declared to House leaders that the
President would not participate in the “constitutionally illegitimate” 2019
efforts to obtain information and characterizing such resistance as the equivalent of “declar[ing] war on
the House’s investigation of the executive branch”).
177. See Andrew Desiderio, Trump Sues to Block House Subpoena of Financial Records, POLITICO
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/22/trump-sues-oversight-committee-chairmanfinance-records-1284995 (House Oversight and Reform Committee subpoena of Trump’s accounting
firm); Maggie Haberman, William K. Rashbaum & David Enrich, Trump Sues Deutsche Bank and Capital
One
to
Block
Compliance
With
Subpoenas,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
29,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/trump-lawsuit-deutsche-bank.html (suit to block
financial institutions’ compliance with House Intelligence and Financial Services Committees subpoena
for financial records).
178. See David A. Graham, Don McGahn’s Testimony Would Be the Main Event, ATLANTIC (May
20, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/white-house-blocks-mcgahn-testifyingcongress/589873/.
179. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013)
(denying Obama administration Attorney General’s motion to dismiss subpoena from Republican-led
congressional committee in “Fast and Furious” scandal).
180. On the long history of Congress’s power to investigate, see Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140
S. Ct. 2019, 2029-31 (2020); Raoul Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 865 (1975); James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1926).
181. Compare, e.g., Kircher, supra note 175 (asserting that the Trump administration resisted
congressional oversight to an “unprecedented degree”) with Michael W. McConnell, The Way Trump Is
Asserting the Rights of His Office Is Not Impeachable, WASH. POST (May 1, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/05/01/trump-resists-congressional-subpoenas-thatswhat-presidents-do/ (characterizing Trump administration’s response to congressional investigation as
“unremarkable” and akin to those of his recent predecessors).
182. Trump: We’re Fighting All the Subpoenas, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-were-fighting-all-of-thesubpoenas/2019/04/24/aed13859-e411-4686-9d1d-a535b8d958bd_video.html
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impeachment inquiry.183 Courts have increasingly served as the sole
means to resolve such disputes in recent decades, weakening Congress’s
power to obtain information from the Executive184 without a clear
exercise of legislative will. 185 Facing the Trump administration’s
expansive view of its constitutional privilege to withhold information and
its dismissal of congressional authority, House Democrats moved forward
with impeachment rather than face the delays attendant to high-stakes
constitutional litigation.186 The Trump administration’s defiance of a
Democratic House majority 187 was neither unique nor remarkable, but it
appeared exceptionally public and absolute— part of an unequivocal
resistance to information disclosure to any adverse congressional
investigation of the President and White House.
4. Informal Disclosure Norms
President Trump’s reluctance to disclose information about his
previous and ongoing business concerns further distinguished him from
his predecessors.188 Constitutional structure and some common law

183. See Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, White House Counsel, to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi et al.
(Oct. 8, 2019), at 8, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6459905-White-HouseLetter-to-Pelosi-Impeachment.html; see also Frank O. Bowman III, White House Letter Distorts Both Law
and History on Impeachment, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66534/whitehouse-letter-distorts-both-law-and-history-on-impeachment/ (Cippollone letter’s legal arguments “are
without foundation.”); Keith E. Whittington, Must the House Vote to Authorize an Impeachment Inquiry?,
LAWFARE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/must-house-vote-authorize-impeachmentinquiry (rejecting Cippollone letter’s legal arguments).
184. See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 181-89 (2017).
185. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Will and Leverage, 52 DUKE
L.J. 323 (2002).
186. See Charlie Savage, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit by Ex-Trump Aide Subpoenaed in Impeachment
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/us/kupperman-lawsuitdismissed.html.
187. This dispute is ongoing as of this writing. See Trump v. Mazars USA, L.L.P., 140 S. Ct. 2019,
2035-36 (holding that Congressional subpoenas of presidential information can be enforced, but
remanding to lower courts the application of a four-part test to balance the competing congressional and
executive branch interests); cf. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (rejecting presidential
claims for absolute immunity from subpoenas in a state criminal proceeding and remanding to lower
courts for consideration of other challenges).
188. See Jonathan Adler, All the President’s Papers, 2020 CATO SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(Draft at 1) (“No President has so thoroughly resisted transparency and disentanglement with potential
conflicts of interest.”).
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doctrines—most notably executive privilege—shield the presidency from
the formal openness and ethical requirements that apply more broadly to
the executive branch.189 The same is true of certain statutory and
regulatory disclosure requirements, including exemptions from federal
conflict of interest rules that prohibit officials from participating in
government matters where they have a financial interest.190 But the
President is required to make certain limited disclosures on an annual
basis about his financial and ownership interests.191 Former presidents
and presidential candidates have typically disclosed a fuller picture of
their private holdings than the law requires to comply with informal
expectations and norms.192 Commonly understood as “unwritten or
informal rules of political behavior,”193 “shared codes of conduct that
become common knowledge within a particular community,” 194 or
conventions that suggest what one should do while describing what is
generally done,195 norms have long shaped and constrained presidential
behavior, even as they have evolved over time. Less directly related to
transparency than formal administrative law, such norms concern the
public-facing nature of the presidential office.
Consistent with his willingness to challenge a full range of norms that
cover presidential behavior and statements,196 President Trump refused to
189. On constitutional structure and information access, see Adam M. Samaha, Government
Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 932–56
(2006); on the executive privilege doctrine, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive
Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491 (2007); on the “state secrets” doctrine, see generally Robert
M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249
(2007).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2018).
191. 5 U.S.C. app. § 101(d), (f)(1) (2018).
192. See infra note 197-207 and accompanying text.
193. Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2189 (2018).
194. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 101 (2018).
195. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 2–5 (Max
Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954).
196. President Trump may not have begun the current erosion of prevailing political norms, a
process that Congress seems to have initiated, see David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of
Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2014), but his presidency suggested that norms no longer apply. See Neil S.
Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 192–
98 (2018); Renan, supra note 192, at 2214; W. Bradley Wendel, Law and Nonlegal Norms in Government
Lawyers' Ethics: Discretion Meets Legitimacy, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1995, 2007–08 (2019); Josh Chafetz
& David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1451 (2018); Emily
Bazelon, How Do We Contend with Trump’s Defiance of Norms?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/magazine/how-do-we-contend-with-trumps-defiance-of-
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disclose information about the relationship between his administration
and his notoriously complex personal finances and family business
enterprises.197 A president’s resistance to financial disclosures is difficult
to subject to judicial review and congressional investigation,198 and
concerns a subject that Trump considered privileged well before he
entered politics.199 Most famously, he departed from longstanding
precedent among presidents and presidential candidates by resisting calls
to release his tax returns.200 The annual financial disclosure forms he filed
with the Office of Government Ethics provided only a bare outline of his
income and complex business holdings. 201 He fought a congressional
norms.html?partner=bloomberg (“Trump’s flouting of norms was the siren song of his candidacy, and it
has become a defining feature of his presidency.”). For a sustained account of the norm-based presidency,
including President Trump’s breach of those norms, see Renan, supra note 192.
197. See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli, Trump's Financial Disclosure Form: It's Complicated, L.A.
TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washingtonupdates-trump-releases-financial-disclosure-1497653636-htmlstory.html (reporting on the release of
President Trump’s financial disclosure form, which listed “565 separate roles that Trump holds in his vast
business empire, largely LLCs and corporations established to manage his hotels, apartments and golf
courses”); Ryan Lizza, How Trump Broke the Office of Government Ethics, THE NEW YORKER (July 14,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ryan-lizza/how-trump-broke-the-office-of-government-ethics
(explaining how Trump departed from ethical norms regarding conflicts of financial interest and
disclosure of personal holdings); David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan O'Connell, Nine Questions About
President Trump's Businesses and Possible Conflicts of Interest, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2018),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/nine-questions-about-president-trumps-businesses-andpossible-conflicts-of-interest/2018/01/29/f8b2a3a8-014f-11e8-9d31-d72cf78dbeee_story.html
(attempting, based on publicly available information, to answer questions about Trump’s businesses, the
revocable trust he created upon taking office, and the extent of his indebtedness).
198. Challenges to the President’s ongoing business interests under the Emoluments Clause failed.
See, e.g., In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
under Emoluments Clause). Efforts to secure his tax returns through congressional investigations and state
legislation did not bear fruit during his presidency. See Jeff Stein et al., ‘It’s Going to Be Tough’: House
Democrats Appear Less Likely to Get Trump’s Tax Returns Before 2020 Election, WASH. POST (Aug. 22,
2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/22/its-going-be-tough-house-democrats-appearless-likely-get-trumps-tax-returns-before-election/.
199. See DAVID CAY JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF DONALD TRUMP 77–83, 147–53 (2016)
(describing Trump’s longstanding effort to obfuscate and keep secrets about his net worth and his public
image).
200. See Siegel, supra note 195, at 201–02; Daniel Hemel, Can New York Publish President
Trump’s State Tax Returns?, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 62, 63 (2017); see generally George K. Yin,
Congressional Authority to Obtain and Release Tax Returns, 154 TAX NOTES 1013 (2017); Jill Disis,
Presidential Tax Returns: It Started with Nixon. Will It End with Trump?, CNN (Jan. 26, 2017, 2:06 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/news/economy/donald-trump-tax-returns/index.html.
201. See Anna Massoglia & Karl Evers-Hillstrom, World of Influence: A Guide to Trump’s Foreign
Business
Interests,
OPENSECRETS.ORG
(June
4,
2019),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/06/trump-foreign-business-interests/ (noting that “Annual
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committee’s subpoena of his accounting firm to review his financial
records,202 while his Treasury Secretary refused to comply with a
congressional subpoena to release his tax returns. 203
Trump also declined either to establish a blind trust to hold his
investments or to limit his investments to assets like diversified mutual
funds over which he would have no control. 204 Blind trusts and mutual
funds would protect against corruption from within the White House by
either forcing the public disclosure of a President’s assets or shielding the
information from the President and those who would seek his favor or do
his bidding. Instead, Trump placed his assets into a revocable trust
managed by two of his children and a longtime business associate, of
which he is the sole beneficiary and over which he appears to retain
significant authority.205 He pledged that any profits from foreign
governments would be donated to the United States Treasury, but that
promise was unenforceable and its fulfillment was impossible to review
without full disclosure of his business and financial interests.206 This hints

disclosure forms only require assets held at the end of the reporting period to be disclosed and require
only minimal documentation of transactions. Income and property values are also often listed in wide
ranges so the total amount may, in actuality, be much higher or lower.”); see also Decca Muldowney et
al., A Guide for Digging Through Trump’s Financial Disclosures, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2018, 5:00
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/a-guide-for-digging-through-trumps-financial-disclosures
(attempting to piece together Trump’s finances and business interests from his financial disclosure form).
202. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, No. 19-5142, 2019 WL 5089748 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2019)
(upholding congressional authority to issue a subpoena to investigate the President’s finances).
203. Alan Rappeport & Nicholas Fandos, Steven Mnuchin Refuses to Comply with Subpoena for
Trump’s
Tax
Returns,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
17,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/us/politics/mnuchin-trump-tax-returns-subpoena.html.
204. Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., Office of Gov’t Ethics, Remarks at the Brookings Institution(Jan.
11,
2017),
available
at
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/20170111_oge_shaub_remarks.pdf/.
205. See Derek Kravitz & Al Shaw, Trump Lawyer Confirms President Can Pull Money from His
Businesses
Whenever
He
Wants,
PROPUBLICA
(Apr.
4,
2017,
5:53
PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-pull-money-his-businesses-whenever-he-wants-withouttelling-us; Steve Reilly et al., Did Trump Keep His 19 Promises to Insulate Himself from His Business?
Only He Knows, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2019, 9:08 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/politics/2019/03/18/president-donald-trumps-promises-didnt-end-businessentanglements/3030377002/; Massoglia & Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 200.
206. See Bernard Condon, Trump Org Donates Nearly $200k to Cover Foreign Profits,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/a4349ac80a7048bdb61f017fffd9623f;
David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan O’Connell, Trump Organization Says It Has Donated Foreign Profits
to U.S. Treasury, but Declines to Share Details, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-organization-says-it-has-donated-foreign-profits-to-us-
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not simply at opacity, but at corruption. As two Trump critics have
written, “In ways large and small, he has put the power of the presidency
to work for his friends, his family, and himself.”207
Despite the efforts of President Trump and his administration,
information about his administration and finances leaked. The press
vigorously covered the administration, relying on documentary leaks and
anonymous sources208—coverage and leaks that Trump frequently
assailed, dismissed, and occasionally sought to prevent. 209 Transparency
laws and norms, however, demand more of an administration than leaks
to the press, and the Trump administration was neither transparent in an
absolute sense nor when compared to its predecessor. Courts imposed

treasury-but-declines-to-share-details/2018/02/26/747522e0-1b22-11e8-ae5a16e60e4605f3_story.html?noredirect=on.
207. BENJAMIN WITTES & SUSAN HENNESSEY, UNMAKING THE PRESIDENCY: DONALD TRUMP'S
WAR ON THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL OFFICE 138 (2020).
208. Leaks out of the Trump White House regularly occurred. See Steven Aftergood, Leaks of
Classified Info Surge Under Trump, SECRECY NEWS BLOG (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/04/leaks-surge/; Ken Dilanian, Under Trump, More Leaks — and More
Leak Investigations, NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justicedepartment/under-trump-more-leaks-more-leak-investigations-n992121; Jordan Fabian, Leaks continue
to plague Trump White House despite crackdown, THE HILL (June 9, 2018, 6:17 A.M.),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/391430-leaks-plague-trump-white-house-with-no-end-insight. Financial information too became public. See Jonathan Swan, Mary Trump book: How she leaked
Trump financials to NYT, AXIOS (July 7, 2020), https://www.axios.com/mary-trump-book-donald-trumpfinancials-c1635cb1-d1b0-48e0-b816-72d270170796.html. Indeed, the Trump administration leaked not
simply despite its failed efforts to hold information, see, e.g., Mark Fenster, Revealing Secrecy Tools,
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/revealing-secrecy-tools/
(discussing Trump’s use of non-disclosure agreements and noting their limitations and failures during his
presidency), but as part of its everyday operations. See Daniel Froomkin, Press Watch: Donald Trump
says not to trust anonymous sources — for once, he's not lying, SALON (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://www.salon.com/2019/12/07/press-watch-donald-trump-says-not-to-trust-anonymous-sources-foronce-hes-not-lying/ (distinguishing between leaks and the ubiquity of “spin” from individuals within the
Trump administration, who speak anonymously to the press for their own purposes); Margaret Sullivan,
Trump’s tough talk on leaks is one thing. His actions tell another tale, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/dont-use-my-name-but-heres-a-scoop-trump-lovesleaks-some-of-them/2017/02/28/dcab5338-fd06-11e6-8ebe-6e0dbe4f2bca_story.html (describing the
administration’s propensity to leak strategically).
209. On the Trump administration’s efforts to clamp down on leaks, see Katie Benner, Pentagon
Analyst Is Charged in Leaks of Classified Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/us/politics/kyle-frese-classified-leaks.html; Mike Allen, Trump’s
Risky Leak War, AXIOS (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.axios.com/trumps-risky-leak-war-1513304673da66b4fb-35a5-46dc-9cd5-d134d1dbabd4.html. On the omnipresence and complexity of leaking from the
executive branch, see David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013).
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some constraints upon his administration,210 but its transparency record
ranged from troubling—in terms of the administration’s legal
compliance—to poor in its dealings with Congress and its flouting of
ethical norms regarding the opaque and uniquely tangled web of Trump’s
wealth.211
B. President Trump’s Populist Transparency
This section presumes that Donald Trump campaigned as a right-wing
populist and continued to present himself as such after the 2020
election—a presumption that seems to be the general consensus among
experts in the study of populism and conservatism. 212 For purposes of this
Article, the fact that he did not govern as a traditional populist, especially
on economic and regulatory policy,213 is less important than his reliance
on a populist style in his self-presentation, communication with his
followers, and understanding of transparency.

210. See supra Part III.A.ii.
211. The record of his administration’s senior cabinet members and high-level administrators and
advisors was little better. Many of them resigned after revelations about their activities both while in office
and prior to entering the administration. See Paul Waldman, New Revelations Show the Trump
Administration Is Making the Swamp Even Swampier, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/10/new-revelations-show-trump-administration-ismaking-swamp-even-swampier/; David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Trump’s Corruption: The
Definitive List, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/opinion/trumpadministration-corruption-conflicts.html. The turnover rate at the top levels of the Trump Administration
through mid-2019 was far higher than those of all of his predecessors. See Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Tracking
Turnover
in
the
Trump
Administration,
BROOKINGS
(August
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration/ (showing that the
Trump Administration’s turnover rate of senior advisers was as high in his third year in office as his
predecessors’ full-term records).
212. See JUDIS, supra note 6, at 66–74; COREY ROBIN, THE REACTIONARY MIND: CONSERVATISM
FROM EDMUND BURKE TO DONALD TRUMP 242–44 (2d ed. 2017); Uri Friedman, What Is a Populist? And
Is
Donald
Trump
One?,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525/; Oliver &
Rahn, supra note 53, at 202.
213. See William E. Scheuerman, Donald Trump meets Carl Schmitt, 45 PHIL. & SOC. CRIT. 1170,
1176-78 (2019); Matthew Yglesias, The Trump-Era Threat to Democracy Is the Opposite of Populism,
VOX (Dec. 10, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/10/18126132/trumppopulism-democracy-threat-minority-rule.
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1. Transparency, Live: Trump Rallies
Trump’s rally speeches, delivered in his highly performative,
spontaneous style before thousands of attendees and often simulcast by
television networks and cable news channels, served as his signature form
of direct address to his base. He continued using the basic format of his
campaign rallies immediately after the election, and he held more such
political events than any recent sitting president, including forty-six in
2018 in the lead-up to that year’s midterm elections, twenty-one in 2019,
and ten in early-2020, prior to the COIVD-19 pandemic.214 The rallies did
not focus on policy in any traditional sense, and he did not use them
primarily to announce new initiatives or the nomination or departure of a
member of his administration.215 By rarely unveiling or divulging
information that his followers and the broader public do not already know,
they did not at all resemble the disclosure of records, data, or information
that have come to constitute transparency as a legal concept. Instead, the
rallies served as a means to extend his campaign and reach his base in a
live, telecast performance that focused political and popular attention on
Trump and his presidency.
The pre-pandemic rally speeches’ content resumed the narrative he
began upon announcing his campaign. They replayed, for the pleasure of
Trump supporters and to the anger and dismay of those who opposed him,
what was already known: that he based his presidency on a nationalism
214. See
List
of
Post-Election
Donald
Trump
Rallies,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_post-election_Donald_Trump_rallies (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
By mid-October 2018, Axios reported, President Trump had held thirty-three “#MAGA campaign rallies”
compared to President Obama’s nine political rallies and one rally for what became known as Obamacare.
See Mike Allen, Trump vs. Obama: The Midterm Rallies Edition, AXIOS (Oct. 14, 2018),
https://www.axios.com/2018-midterm-elections-donald-trump-barack-obama-rallies-e83bf5af-9fc2444a-b56a-d974b20df3da.html; see also Jill Colvin, Trump Has Held More than 2 Dozen Rallies as He
Kicks into High Gear Ahead of the High-Stakes Midterms, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2018, 11:36 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-rallies-increase-ahead-of-midterms-2018-10; Dave Levinthal,
Donald Trump Created a Permanent Presidential Campaign. Here’s How, CENTER. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/donald-trump-president-campaign-moneyfundraising/. On Trump’s embrace of his rallies and endless campaign, see Charles Homans, The PostCampaign Campaign of Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/magazine/donald-trump-rallies-campaigning-president.html;
Gabby Orr, Advisers Urge Trump to Defer 2020 Rallies, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2019, 5:02 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/08/trump-2020-rallies-1211799.
215. He did, however, make policy announcements on Twitter just prior to rallies. See, e.g., Aaron
Rupar, Trump Blindsides ICE with Mass Deportation Announcement on Eve of Reelection Rally, VOX
(June 18, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/6/18/18683600/trump-mass-deportation-tweet-ice.
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that drew moral and racial boundaries around the groups to which his
supporters presumptively belong in order to exclude others whom he cast
as representing social and political threats to his vision of the nation.216
His post-election speeches adapted his campaign narrative in light of his
victory, the story of which he regularly retold as a combination of
stupendous upset and inevitability. America regained its status due to the
unprecedented and unsurpassed successes President Trump had achieved:
economic growth, as evidenced by the number of jobs created and rising
stock indexes; widespread deregulation; tax cuts he signed into law; and
the imminent completion of “The Wall” at the U.S.-Mexico border and
the forthcoming replacement of “Obamacare” with a far superior health
finance system, neither of which occurred during his presidency.217 His
speeches were most specific in the insults he directed at the enemies that
stood in his way. These included opposition Democrats, the “fake news,”
“Crooked Hillary,” and the special counsel investigation’s “Witch Hunt”
and the “Russia Hoax” that caused the special counsel’s appointment.
Both within and across performances, his speeches rambled and repeated
little that would enlighten or educate the public about his administration,
and often misstated or blatantly lied about easily confirmable facts.218
But the speeches’ content was secondary to their form and context.

216. See JENNIFER SCLAFANI, TALKING DONALD TRUMP: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF STYLE,
METADISCOURSE, AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 81 (2018); Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Doron Taussig,
Disruption, Demonization, Deliverance, and Norm Destruction: The Rhetorical Signature of Donald J.
Trump, 132 POL. SCI. Q. 619, 619 (2017); Michèle Lamont, Bo Yun Park & Elena Ayala-Hurtado,
Trump’s Electoral Speeches and His Appeal to the American White Working Class, 68 BRIT. J. SOC. S153,
S173 (2017); Alexandra Homolar & Ronny Scholz, The Power of Trump-Speak: Populist Crisis
Narratives and Ontological Security, 32 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 344, 347–51 (2019).
217. A database of Trump speeches appears at Donald Trump Speech Transcripts, FACTBASE,
https://factba.se/transcripts/speeches (last visited July 30, 2019). Various sources publish speech
transcripts. See, e.g., Abbey Doyle, ICYMI: Here’s a Transcript of President Trump’s Speech at the
Evansville
Rally,
COURIER
&
PRESS
(Sept.
4,
2016,
11:06
AM),
https://www.courierpress.com/story/news/local/2018/09/04/heres-transcript-president-trumps-speechevansville-rally/1191281002/; Times Staff Writer, Here’s a Full Transcript of President Trump’s Speech
from His Tampa Rally, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2018/08/01/heres-a-full-transcript-of-president-trumps-speech-from-his-tampa-rally.
218. See Salvador Rizzo, Anatomy of a Trump rally: 67 percent of claims are false or lacking
evidence, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/07/anatomytrump-rally-percent-claims-are-false-or-lacking-evidence. For a more comprehensive effort to track
President
Trump’s
false
claims,
see
Trump
Claims
Database,
WASH.
POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database (last visited July 31, 2019)
(tracking thousands of his false and misleading claims).
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They were raucous spectacles akin to a rock concert219 and served as a
communal, sometimes even joyful experience for those in attendance,220
allowing them to solidify and proclaim their position as Trump
supporters.221 Attendees laughed at Trump’s jokes and familiar talking
points, and they participated by chanting phrases that demonized his
enemies. Crowds became as much an element of the televised events as
Trump’s own speech—even, at times, engaging in physical altercations
against anti-Trump protestors and the press.222 Although they already
knew in advance how Trump’s speech would proceed, either from
attending previous ones or watching them on television, audience
members claimed to feel renewed by his repertoire and mix of repetition
219. Commentators most frequently analogized Trump rallies to Grateful Dead shows. See, e.g.,
Noah Bierman, Anatomy of a Trump Rally: The Hero (That’s Him), a Jester (Also Him), Villains, Damsels,
Dystopia and Lots of Grievances, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-rally-anatomy-20181010-story.html; Katie Rogers,
The Trump Rally: A Play in Three Acts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/12/us/politics/trump-maga-rally-play.html; Tamara Keith
and Amy Walter on Trump campaign kickoff, Democratic debates, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 17, 2019),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/tamara-keith-and-amy-walter-on-trump-campaign-kickoffdemocratic-debates. Given the audience’s demographic and likely aversion to hallucinogens, Jimmy
Buffett concerts seem more analogous.
220. Ryan Lizza, The Unexpected Joy at a Trump Rally in Iowa, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/amp/news/2020/01/31/unexpected-joy-trump-rally-iowa-109864.
221. See Sam Altman, I’m a Silicon Valley Liberal, and I Traveled Across the Country to Interview
100 Trump Supporters—Here’s What I Learned, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2017, 11:34 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/sam-altman-interview-trump-supporters-2017-2
[https://perma.cc/PDL9-N4XV]; Bierman, supra note 219; Dave Osborn, Trump Supporters Line Up
early for Front-Row Seat to Tuesday's Rally in Orlando, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (June 18, 2019, 11:37
AM),
https://www.naplesnews.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/17/donald-trump-rally-orlandosupporters-arrive-early-front-row-seat/1476155001/.
222. Jamelle Bouie, The Joy of Hatred, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/opinion/trump-rally.html; Kathleen Hunter, “Send Her Back” Is
Trump’s New “Lock Her Up”: Campaign Update, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 18, 2019, 2:28 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-18/-send-her-back-is-trump-s-new-lock-her-upcampaign-update; Ayal Feinberg et al., Counties that Hosted a 2016 Trump Rally Saw a 226 Percent
Increase
in
Hate
Crimes,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
22,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/trumps-rhetoric-does-inspire-more-hatecrimes/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9096859b2711#click=https://t.co/bYXsN60xzH; Bodyslams, Bombs
and Shoves: Anti-media Violence in Trump's America, AXIOS (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/violence-against-media-bombs-shootings-trump-a59584cb-ac2c-4813-bfef7b3a4233690d.html; William Saletan, Trump Is Celebrating Violence and Nationalism at His Rallies,
SLATE (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:41 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/trump-nationalist-gopviolence.html; see also Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 605 (6th Cir. 2018) (dismissing, on First
Amendment grounds, plaintiff’s claim that Trump statements at campaign rally had incited crowd to beat
protestors).
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and structured improvisation as well as by their own collective
response.223 Some traveled long distances to attend rallies, arriving hours
before scheduled start times to mingle and stand in line for seats while
wearing or purchasing branded merchandise to announce their loyalty. 224
The rallies reached their tragic apotheosis on January 6, 2021, with the
“Stop the Steal” rally at the Ellipse to protest Congress’s certification of
the electoral college vote, which inspired his supporters to march to the
Capitol and a mob of them to invade it.
The rallies’ performative, repetitive, nearly ritualistic qualities may not
have revealed the state and its actions in any formal legal sense, but they
served as a key form of communication from Trump to his supporters.
They displayed his emotions and personal beliefs as they demonstrated
his willingness to speak his mind (and his followers’ feelings) even at the
risk of giving offense. His followers viewed his willingness to speak
bluntly, humorously, and offensively as a form of truth-telling.225 As
president, Trump seemed “authentic”—a term his supporters used to refer
to his unrehearsed, plain-spoken, and ultimately transparent rhetoric and
style of address. 226 Indeed, the performative nature of his speeches and
223. Ed Pilkington, Feel the Love, Feel the Hate – My Week in the Cauldron of Trump's Wild
Rallies, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/01/trump-ralliesamerica-midterms-white-house; Rogers, supra note 219; Matthew Stolle, Trump's Vanguard Sees Rallies
as a Lovefest, POST-BULLETIN (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.postbulletin.com/news/local/trump-svanguard-sees-rallies-as-a-lovefest/article_50649644-c75a-11e8-a0d0-f773c3159bfe.html.
224. Altman, supra note 221; Rogers, supra note 219; Jeremy Diamond & Jeff Zeleny, Trump
Rallies: Campaign-funded, for a Reason, CNN (Mar. 26, 2017, 2:43 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/15/politics/donald-trump-campaign-rallies/index.html; Sally Persons,
Trump Campaign Sees Potential for New 2020 Supporters, in Rally Turnout, FOX NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-campaign-sees-potential-for-new-2020-supporters-in-rallyturnout.
225. Matthew J. Dickinson, Explaining Trump’s Support: What We Saw and Heard at His
Campaign Rallies, 16 FORUM: J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 171, 178 (2018); Jamieson & Taussig,
supra note 216, at 621–22; Lamont et al., supra note 216, at S165; Robin Tolmach Lakoff, The Hollow
Man: Donald Trump, Populism, and Post-Truth Politics, 16 J. LANGUAGE & POL. 595, 604 (2017).
226. See Nancy Cook, Trump’s Race Playbook: Excoriate the Left and Enthrall His Base, POLITICO
(July 29, 2019, 5:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/29/trump-race-2020-1440436;
Dickinson, supra note 225, at 178; Dahlia Lithwick, In 2020, Voters Should Abandon Their Obsession
with “Authenticity,” SLATE (Feb. 13, 2019, 6:20 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/2020candidates-authenticity-trump-democratic-field.html; John Zogby, Clinton, Trump and the Battle for
Authenticity,
FORBES
(Sept.
24,
2016,
9:36
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnzogby/2016/09/24/clinton-trump-and-the-battle-forauthenticity/#3a50e2664de1. During the 2016 presidential campaign, commentators frequently contrasted
Trump’s seeming surplus of “authenticity” with Hillary Clinton’s alleged lack of it. See Shawn ParryGiles & David Kaufer, Why Do So Many Believe Hillary Clinton Is Inauthentic?, THE CONVERSATION
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their knowing untruth paradoxically appeared to establish that he hid
nothing and that he was more accessible and public than previous
presidents.227 His diction relied on simple, informal, and short nouns and
action verbs that he repeated frequently, enabling his speeches to seem
comprehensible and direct.228 His hand and body gestures, often mocking
and comical in ways that more careful and studied politicians avoid,
further accentuated his bond with his followers (who understood his jokes
and found them funny) and his differences from those whom he
mocked.229
Given regularly in a mass, live setting among devoted followers, and
then broadcast live semi-regularly on Fox News,230 Trump’s speeches
offered a collective experience that felt authentic—even to those who
opposed him, who viewed his speeches as accurately reflecting his beliefs
and prejudices. In his rallies, Trump stood and spoke as a singular leader
in front of thousands, claiming to represent millions of like-minded
citizens and to reveal their shared concerns and identity.

(Oct. 30, 2016, 10:09 PM), https://theconversation.com/why-do-so-many-believe-hillary-clinton-isinauthentic-67302.
227. See Oliver Hahl, Minjae Kim & Ezra W. Zuckerman Sivan, The Authentic Appeal of the Lying
Demagogue: Proclaiming the Deeper Truth about Political Illegitimacy, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 25–26
(2018).
228. See Jacques Savoy, Trump’s and Clinton’s Style and Rhetoric During the 2016 Presidential
Election, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE LINGUISTICS 168, 168 (2017); Orly Kayam, The Readability and Simplicity
of Donald Trump’s Language, 16 POL. STUD. REV. 73, 81–86 (2018); Yaqin Wang & Haitao Liu, Is Trump
Always Rambling Like a Fourth-Grade Student? An Analysis of Stylistic Features of Donald Trump’s
Political Discourse During the 2016 Election, 29 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 299, 299 (2018); Sara Ahmadian,
Sara Azarshahi & Delroy L. Paulhus, Explaining Donald Trump via Communication Style: Grandiosity,
Informality, and Dynamism, 107 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 49, 52 (2017); Marta
Degani, Endangered Intellect: A Case Study of Clinton vs Trump Campaign Discourse, 8 IPERSTORIA
131, 133–34 (2016); Homolar & Scholz, supra note 216, at 348. Trump thus represented a broader trend
in presidential rhetoric towards conversational, anti-intellectual discourse. See generally ELVIN T. LIM ,
THE ANTI-INTELLECTUAL PRESIDENCY: THE DECLINE OF PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC FROM GEORGE
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2018).
229. Kira Hall, Donna M. Goldstein & Matthew Bruce Ingram, The Hands of Donald Trump:
Entertainment, Gesture, Spectacle, 6 HAU: J. ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 71, 74–75 (2016).
230. On how television networks’ decisions about whether to telecast Trump rallies evolved, see
Todd Shields & Emma Kinery, Trump Can't Rely on Cable News Running His Rallies In Full Anymore,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-11/trumprallies-no-longer-assured-airtime-as-tv-networks-reassess.
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2. Transparency in 240 Characters: @realDonaldTrump
President Trump’s Twitter account pursued a similar mode of address
as his speeches. He created the @realDonaldTrump account in 2009 to
spread his opinion and extend his brand,231 and he credits Twitter with
helping him secure the 2016 election by giving him a platform “to bypass
. . . unfair media coverage and speak directly to voters.”232 In a stipulation
as part of litigation over whether the Constitution allowed him to block
users from his Twitter account, President Trump stated that since his
inauguration in 2016 and with the assistance of White House Social
Media Director Daniel Scavino, he used the @realDonaldTrump account
“to announce, describe, and defend his policies; to promote his
Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official decisions; to
engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; [and] to
challenge media organizations whose coverage of his Administration he
believes to be unfair.”233 His first press secretary declared that tweets from
the @realDonaldTrump account should be considered “official
statements by the President of the United States,” 234 and his tweets were
often posted from both his personal account and the official presidential
account (@POTUS) within minutes of each other. 235
Despite their official nature and his Twitter account’s status as a public
forum,236 President Trump’s tweets appeared spontaneous, unfiltered,

231. Douglas B. McKechnie, From Secret White House Recordings to @realdonaldtrump: The
Democratic Value of Presidential Tweets, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 611, 632 (2018); Anthony J. Gaughan,
Trump, Twitter, and the Russians: The Growing Adolescence of Federal Campaign Finance Law, 27 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 79, 97–98 (2017).
232. Chris Baynes, Donald Trump Says He Would Not Be President Without Twitter, INDEPENDENT
(Oct. 22, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donaldtrump-tweets-twitter-social-media-facebook-instagram-fox-business-network-would-not-bea8013491.html; Shontavia J. Johnson, Donald Trump, Disruptive Technologies, and Twitter’s Role in the
2016 American Presidential Election, 27 WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 39, 77, 79 (2018).
233. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 2019).
234. Id. Notably, the government stipulated in Knight First Amendment that the President’s tweets
are “official records” that must be preserved under the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2202. Id. at
232.
235. McKechnie, supra note 231, at 632. In terms of overall activity, the President appeared to favor
using his own @realDonaldTrump account for the majority of his Twitter activity. The
@realDonaldTrump handle posted over 34,000 tweets, while the @POTUS account posted about 4,000.
See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump; Donald Trump
(@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus.
236. Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 237.
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honest, and, above all, authentically Trumpian—the product of whatever
was on his mind at the moment of its sending.237 They revealed his
thoughts, they invoked his supporters as “Americans” and “the people”
(and called out his opponents as neither), and they very occasionally
announced administration policy as well as political appointments and
resignations.238 They were “punchy,” timely, and ephemeral—and
thereby newsworthy and attention-grabbing.239 Their misspellings,
typographical errors, and dramatic use of all-caps further accentuated the
account’s authenticity, distinguishing his voice from that of the polished,
professional campaigners who allow their accounts to be managed by paid
professionals.240 They also made his account appear similar to those of
his base of supporters.241 Indeed, his tweets both previewing and during
the “Stop the Steal” rally that preceded the Capitol riot and insurrection
237. See generally BRIAN L. OTT & GREG DICKINSON, THE TWITTER PRESIDENCY: DONALD J.
TRUMP AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE RAGE 59 (2019) (noting the “homology,” or structural similarity,
between Trump’s “natural style of speaking and Twitter’s underlying logic”); Galen Stolee & Steve Caton,
Twitter, Trump, and the Base: A Shift to a New Form of Presidential Talk? , 6 SIGNS & SOC’Y 147, 161
(2018) (noting how the tweets’ form and syntax confirm Trump’s “‘authenticity’ to his supporters”); see
also Gunn Enli, Twitter as Arena for the Authentic Outsider: Exploring the Social Media Campaigns of
Trump and Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential Election, 32 EUR. J. COMM. 50, 50 (2017) (noting use of
“authenticity markers,” tweets that “expressed impoliteness and political incorrectness, often using capital
letters,” marking Trump as an “authentic outsider”); Ramona Kreis, The “Tweet” Politics of Donald
Trump, J. LANG. & POL. 607, 615 (2017) (characterizing Trump’s Twitter account as employing “an
‘authentic style’ which corroborates his constructed position of an outsider and legitimate representative
of the people distancing himself from the establishment”); Paromita Pain & Gina Masullo Chen, The
President Is In: Public Opinion and the Presidential Use of Twitter, SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, Apr.–June
2019, at 9, available at https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119855143 (“He uses a colloquial, conversational
style of language that seems to illustrate his attempts to be authentic and unfiltered, which underscores
his populist message.”).
238. According to an online archive of his tweets, the Twitter accounts he most frequently
mentioned were his own and those of his family and Fox News and its hosts; as of August 1, 2019, his
presidential tweets have invoked “Fake News” (362 times), Russia and “collusion” (452 times), and
“Clinton” (212 times). During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump’s account was far less likely to take
a position on a particular issue than Clinton’s account, but much more likely to attract attention in the
news media. See Heather K. Evans, Kayla J. Brown & Tiffany Wimberly, “Delete Your Account”: The
2016 Presidential Race on Twitter, 36 SOC. SCI . COMP. REV. 500, 503–07 (2017).
239. Stolee & Caton, supra note 237, at 161–63.
240. Enli, supra note 237, at 59.
241. See generally Thomas Gallagher, The Outsider on the Inside: Donald Trump’s Twitter Activity
and the Rhetoric of Separation from Washington Culture, 27 ATLANTIC J. COMM. 183 (2019) (noting
prevalence of Trump’s presidential tweets that present him as independent of party and government); see
also Stolee & Caton, supra note 237, at 164; Pain & Chen, supra note 237, at 9; Andrea McDonnell &
Mark Wheeler, @realDonaldTrump: Political Celebrity, Authenticity, and Para-social Engagement on
Twitter, 10 CELEBRITY STUD. 427 (2019).
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were read by many of his followers as direct invitations to disrupt the
peaceful transfer of power—and ultimately led Twitter to ban him from
its platform.242 By relying more heavily on Twitter than on press releases
and formal and official statements, Trump’s campaign and presidency
intimated that his sentiments exclusively constituted the direction of the
White House, executive branch, and nation. 243
C. Conclusion
The Trump administration did not make the federal bureaucracy more
visible in a technical sense (although he shrunk parts of it, most notably
the State Department244 and National Security Council245), and his
administration’s compliance with administrative laws including FOIA
were marginally worse than that of his immediate predecessor.246 He
explicitly refused to follow presidential norms regarding information
disclosure about his personal finances—types of documents over which
courts and Congress failed to exercise clear authority 247 and to which

242. Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html.
243. Corina Lacatus, Populism and the 2016 American Election: Evidence from Official Press
Releases and Twitter, 52 PS: POL. SCI . & POL. 223, 226 (2019).
244. See Jack Corrigan & Government Executive, The Hollowing Out of the State Department
Continues,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
11,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/tillerson-trump-state-foreign-service/553034/
(identifying drop in State Department’s civilian workforce); Robbie Gramer & Colum Lynch, Despite
Pompeo’s Call for ‘Swagger,’ Trump Slashes Diplomatic Budget, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/trump-federal-budget-steep-cuts-to-state-department-foreign-aiddevelopment-diplomacy-pompeo/ (noting “steep cuts to the State Department and U.S. Agency for
International Development” in Trump Administration’s proposed 2020 budget); Erich Wagner, These
Agencies Have Lost the Most Workers Under Trump, GOV. EXEC. (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.govexec.com/management/2018/08/these-agencies-have-lost-most-workers-undertrump/150577/ (twelve of fifteen Cabinet-level agencies have shrunk in size under President Trump).
245. See Jennifer Jacobs & Justin Sink, Trump Orders Cut to National Security Staff After WhistleBlower, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-05/trumporders-cut-to-national-security-staff-after-whistle-blower.
246. On challenges under the Emoluments Clause and efforts to require release of his tax forms,
see supra note 198.
247. Challenges to the President’s ongoing business interests under the Emoluments Clause failed.
See, e.g., In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
under Emoluments Clause). Efforts to secure his tax returns through congressional investigations and state
legislation did not bear fruit during his presidency. See Jeff Stein, Rachael Bade & Jacqueline Aleman,
‘It’s Going to Be Tough’: House Democrats Appear Less Likely to Get Trump’s Tax Returns Before 2020
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Trump held fast as a private citizen.248 Transparency advocates and
corruption foes like Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics justifiably
claimed that President Trump had done “exactly the opposite” of draining
the swamp, leading public venality “into uncharted territory, innovating
forms of corruption.”249
But President Trump and his Twitter account were the “real” Donald
Trump, at least to his followers.250 The public could know and understand
his administration simply by paying attention to him rather than to the
documents and statements issued by the White House and his surrogates.
What you saw in his direct public address was what you got: he spoke for
his followers, pronouncing their truth bravely, humorously, and
offensively. He appeared transparent. And those in the press and among
his political opposition who challenged him and his presentation of the
truth surely must lie and keep secrets of their own. They were
simultaneously at least as bad as Trump and unable to pass authoritative
judgment on him.251 His mode of communication—lacking in specifics,
full of hyperbole and often downright lies—thus constituted a
transparency that deemphasized the technocratic in favor of the personal,
populist, and, ultimately, political.
V. TRANSPARENCY BETWEEN POPULIST POLITICS AND TECHNOCRATIC
ADMINISTRATION
Donald Trump’s claims of transparency are one part of the broader
populist style that he exemplified as president. Like other nationalist,
right-wing populists who have won recent elections, Trump claimed to
uphold transparency as one among numerous of the “general signifiers”

Election, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/22/its-goingbe-tough-house-democrats-appear-less-likely-get-trumps-tax-returns-before-election/.
248. See DAVID CAY JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF DONALD TRUMP 77–83, 147–53 (2016)
(describing Trump’s longstanding effort to obfuscate and keep secrets about his net worth and his public
image).
249. That is his Twitter handle. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrum), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
250. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, Trump’s 2,000 Conflicts of Interest (and
Counting), https://www.citizensforethics.org/2000-trump-conflicts-of-interest-counting/ (last visited
Aug. 30, 2019).
251. See Clare Birchall, Interrupting Transparency , in TRANSPARENCY, SOCIETY, AND
SUBJECTIVITY, supra note 117 , at 343, 359-60.
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of democracy.252 Like other populists, he used (and is likely to continue
to use) new communications platforms to speak directly to his followers
and to present them with at least a veneer of an authentic voice. 253 As the
political theorist Nadia Urbinati has argued:
A populist government relies on, but also reinforces and amplifies, a
strongly opinionated audience that clamors for the direct translation of its
opinions into decisions. This audience becomes intolerant of dissent and
disparaging of pluralism; and, in addition it claims full transparency, a
“virtue” that is supposed to expunge the “hypocrisy” of pragmatic
politics.254

This is a different understanding of transparency than the one that the
Freedom of Information movement has developed. Deeply partisan and
political, Trump’s transparency was subject not only to his agenda and
whims, but also to his false statements and outright lies.
Trump frustrated his opponents with his failure to meet transparency’s
technocratic rules and normative expectations that at least in theory are
subject to the neutral rule of law and to widely-held and generallyapplicable norms. But his supporters not only found those rules and
expectations irrelevant, they may have even enjoyed the degree to which
his administration frustrated laws enforced by his opponents and the
bureaucratic “deep state” and that were utilized by the mainstream press
to criticize him.255 This is clear hypocrisy. Trump and his supporters
252. Giuseppe Zaccaria, The People and Populism, 31 RATIO JURIS. 33, 42 (2018). Trump was like
other contemporary populists in this regard, even if he governed somewhat differently. Compare, for
example, Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte, who shares Trump’s communicative style but who
governs more violently, see Nicole Curato, Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and
the New Terms of Philippine Populism, 47 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 142 (2017); and Hungary’s Victor Orbán,
who shares Trump’s tendency to warn of secret conspiracies that threaten the people and his party’s rule
but who governs more paternalistically (and corruptly), see Zsolt Enyedi, Paternalist populism and
illiberal elitism in Central Europe, 21 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 9 (2016).
253. See MOFFITT, supra note 42, at 91–92 (noting the relationship between contemporary
populism and social media); see generally ANGELA NAGLE, KILL ALL NORMIES: ONLINE CULTURE WARS
FROM 4CHAN AND TUMBLR TO TRUMP AND THE ALT-RIGHT (2017) (chronicling the rise of the online altright and its relationship to the 2016 election and Trump’s racial and gender politics).
254. URBINATI, supra note 21, at 16. On the role of the relationship among transparency, trust, and
a public’s personal connection to leadership, see Portia Roelofs, Transparency and Mistrust: Who or What
Should Be Made Transparent?, 32 GOVERNANCE 565, 576-77 (2019).
255. This enjoyment in transgression, engaged by trolling the righteous norms of elites, is an
example of what David Karpf identified as Trump’s supporters’ tendency to act as a weaponized,
automated affective public—a networked public formation mobilized through sentiment. See David
Karpf, Digital politics after Trump, ANNALS OF THE INT’L COMM. ASS’N, DOI:
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continued to express outrage over Barack Obama’s “missing” birth
certificate and Secretary of State Clinton’s private email server, but were
at most apathetic about Trump’s refusal to issue his tax returns and about
his and his administration’s efforts to control his personal and presidential
information. His followers and most of his fellow Republicans either
ignored the administration’s efforts to resist disclosure or affirmatively
applauded them.
President Trump’s embrace of a populist approach to transparency
allows several important insights: first, about transparency’s relationship
to populism and the resulting tensions within transparency as an
administrative norm; and second, about the long-term effects that a
populist leader might have on transparency’s role in a democracy.
A. Transparency, Between Populism and Technocracy
Transparency has always registered in a populist, moralistic voice,
from the Progressive Era and Justice Louis Brandeis’ use of sunlight as a
metaphor to the post-Watergate efforts to establish new open government
mandates and strengthen existing ones. 256 Its advocates promise that
transparency can transform a distant state apart from and in opposition to
the public into an authentically democratic one. This populist promise sits
at the core of all manifestations of transparency as a concept. It provides
a utopian basis for believing in the transformative potential of an
administrative norm to enhance democracy, 257 and it explains why even
the most mainstream politicians who oppose many of populism’s
manifestations must nevertheless embrace parts of its program.258
Transparency and populism envision a more authentic relationship
between the state and public, and both have no essential relationship with
a specific political party or set of substantive ideological or policy
commitments.
Just as transparency incorporates populist politics, populism—even in
10.1080/23808985.2017.1316675, at 4-5 (2017) (borrowing the concept of “affective publics” from ZIZI
PAPACHARISSI, AFFECTIVE PUBLICS: SENTIMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS (2014)); see also Stolee
& Caton, supra note 237, at 155-56, 163 (discussing trolling as a practice of provocation engaged in by
alt-right members, Trump supporters, and Trump himself against their opposition).
256. See supra Part II-C.
257. See FENSTER, supra note 22, at 192.
258. See Giorgos Katsambekis, The Populist Surge in Post-Democratic Times: Theoretical and
Political Challenges, 88 POL. Q. 202, 209 (2017).
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its right-wing variety—includes an ideal of transparency. The latter relies
on the direct personal connection felt between followers and leadership
and on the ability of the leader, acting on behalf of his public, to use the
instruments of the state to the public’s advantage. 259 The people need to
know the leader as their representative who maintains their sovereignty—
to view him and experience his presentation of an authentic self that
represents their beliefs and their sense of the nation without mediation.
This was the basis of Trump’s understanding of transparency as a populist
norm. By seeing him, the people could see the state.
But transparency, both as a concept and administrative norm, is not
entirely a populist project, notwithstanding the historical and conceptual
relationship between them. Administrative laws and their advocates do
not reject or even question institutional and political pluralism; rather,
they would require the state to inform all members of the public, majority
and minority alike, of its operations in order to enable political contest
among competing voices and institutional accountability. By contrast,
populists in power view government institutions, legal mandates, and
established, competing political parties as a hinderance to truly popular
self-rule.260 Nor does transparency make identity claims by limiting or
favoring its use and benefits to members by party, race, or nationality.
Most open government laws allow anyone to request and review
information or to attend meetings.261 Even a citizenship requirement to
request information, which exists in some U.S. sub-federal state laws,
draws no distinction among citizens and is easy to circumvent. 262 Whereas
259. See URBINATI supra note 21, at 61. The literature on populism offers multiple characterizations
of how populist movements view and use existing state and civil society institutions. Compare, e.g.,
Taggart, supra note 42, at 106 (“Populism has problems with institutions. At the best of times populists
regard institutions with distaste, but at times of crisis they begin to view them as malignant.”), with
MÜLLER, supra note 6, at 39, 44–46 (arguing that populism does not hate all institutions, so long as the
populist leader and movement can exclusively colonize it).
260. See Colin Crouch, Post‐Democracy and Populism, 90 POL. Q. 124, 125 (2019).
261. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.§ 552(a)(3)(A) (2018) (giving access rights to “any person”).
262. See McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 237 (2013) (upholding against constitutional challenge
Virginia’s law restricting the right to seek government documents to citizens of the state); Gavin Aronsen,
This Website Will Help You Outsmart the Supreme Court’s Anti-Transparency Ruling, MOTHER JONES
(May 1, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/supreme-court-cracks-down-publicrecords-access/ (reporting on efforts to pair out-of-state requesters with citizens to cosign requests); see
also Questions Linger over Impact of McBurney v. Young Decision, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/journals/questions-linger-over-impac/(last visited Aug. 29,
2019), (noting that the decision’s impact would likely be mixed, as states might either underenforce
citizenship requirement or remove it altogether).
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transparency advocates promote laws and norms as the means for the
public to protect itself, populist movements offer themselves as the force
that can protect the public from the elites who currently control the state.
Populism thus simultaneously includes and is in tension with
transparency ideals; and transparency advocates speak in a populist
register without necessarily viewing the state as the instrument of an
organized elite.
This tension is most apparent in the conflict between the concept’s
populist tendencies and the technical, bureaucratic tasks advocates face
in making the state more visible263—the constitutional provisions,
statutes, and regulations that establish the laws that impose
transparency.264 Populist understandings of transparency and technocratic
efforts to impose the concept conflict in their theories of governance.265
Although both seek to establish a more accountable, representative
state,266 the populist view embraces the personal and political while the
technocratic view emphasizes neutrality and administration.267 To be
imposed, the simple, visible government that a populist understanding of
transparency holds requires a complex, technocratic set of legal and
regulatory solutions; but the complex solutions required for visibility
obscure the state’s simplicity and prove difficult to understand and
enforce. Freedom of Information laws cannot simply reveal the state and

263. See Huq, supra note 25, at 1134-40 (contrasting the populist desire for a simple government
and constitutional order with the complex nature of contemporary governance). This tension is not
dissimilar from what Louis Michael Seidman has characterized as the “contradiction” that contemporary
liberal constitutionalists face between their progressive embrace of government and their populist
suspicions of it. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, WHY BERNIE IS CONFUSED: POPULIST AND PROGRESSIVE
STRANDS IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 71-72 (SSRN working paper, June 24, 2019), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3409375. I consider this a tension rather than a contradiction because
transparency laws and their advocates further technical mandates even as they might require or utilize
populist political arguments. Technocratic laws and populist politics can co-exist in transparency, in other
words, but they undercut each other and reveal the improbability of achieving one of them fully, because
it would likely come at expense of the other.
264. See supra Part II-A.
265. See Miguel A. Centeno, The New Leviathan: the dynamics and limits of technocracy, 22
THEORY & SOC. 307, 331 (1993).
266. See Christopher Bickerton & Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, Populism and Technocracy, in
KALTWASSER ET AL (eds.), supra note 26, at 326, 329–32.
267. See id. For a discussion of the deterioration of administration as an ideal over the past several
decades (and the attendant ascendancy of political powers and “governance as a concept), long predating
the current populist wave, see PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: IMPARTIALITY,
REFLEXIVITY, PROXIMITY 66-69 (2011).
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its leader without more complex rules and an additional layer of
bureaucracy to establish and enforce administrative procedures.
Transparency includes both populist and technocratic strains that pull in
opposite directions and unravel each other, rendering each impossible to
fully achieve.
In his work on the complex role of disclosure in the relationship
between Paraguayan campesinos and the state, the anthropologist Kregg
Hetherington concludes, “[t]ransparency is a technocratic language built
on the exclusion of the political from governance, which paradoxically
requires excluded political actors to make it work.”268 This paradox
demonstrates both the need for balancing competing conceptions of
transparency and the implausibility of doing so. If a deeply populist form
of transparency—whether in the Trumpian style or otherwise—is defined
as nothing but politics and personality, then it can prove worthless, even
obfuscatory. But if an obsession with technocratic rules and norms
overtakes the understanding and enforcement of democratic obligations,
then transparency serves only as a fetish object for specialists and is
divorced from the democratic public it is intended ultimately to assist and
serve.269
Transparency is ultimately a “protean” concept, as David Pozen has
characterized it,270 and for much if not most of the public constitutes an
administrative norm of at best secondary political importance (if it is
important at all).271 It can be articulated in some combination of technical,
political, or populist ways at particular historical moments.272
268. See HETHERINGTON, supra note 21, at 189.
269. See Kregg Hetherington, Populist Transparency: The Documentation of Reality in Rural
Paraguay, 1 J. LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 45, 47 (2008) (noting that Paraguayan populists effectively
“couch their appeal to the masses through an appeal to experiential reality which is at odds with the
technocratic uses of the term in transparency reforms”).
270. Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 104.
271. Cf. Balkin, supra note 74, at 1985-89 (criticizing progressives’ tendency to overestimate how
much the public is interested in and follows highly technical, complex political debates).
272. I use the term articulation in the sense in which Stuart Hall initially developed it:
By the term ‘articulation’, I mean a connection or link which is not necessarily given in all cases,
as a law or a fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear at all,
which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not ‘eternal’ but has to be
constantly renewed, which can under some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, leading
to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections—re-articulations—being forged. It is
also important that an articulation between different practices does not mean that they become
identical or that one is dissolved into the other. Each retains its distinct determinations and
conditions of existence.
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Transparency advocates and President Trump’s political opponents
contest the extent of the administration’s compliance with rules and
norms in courts, public debates, and political campaigns—in the process
combining a technocratic critique of Trump and his administration’s
failure to meet legal standards with a populist critique of his
administration’s penchant for information control as a symptom of his
corruption. Advocates who focus on expanding and enforcing
technocratic transparency rules rightly protested when President Trump
violated governing norms as part of the political contest over democratic
governance. But they should not dismiss Trump and his supporters’ moral
and populist understanding of transparency without recognizing that
transparency’s operation and legitimacy rest on a populist politics, and
that an emphasis on technocratic rules at the expense of populism may
alienate or bore the public and thereby render the norm powerless.
B. Populism and the Potential Disfigurement of Transparency
President Trump’s departure from existing transparency rules and
norms—incremental differences in some respects, more brazen refusals
to conform in others—not only represented a variance in compliance with
open government mandates, but risked the weakening of an important, if
second-order, democratic value. This is not a problem unique to populism,
however. Given current levels of political partisanship in the U.S.,
transparency’s significance depends upon how it is used against a
particular individual, party, or bureaucracy. 273 Contrast, for example, the
outrage that Republican members of Congress expressed about the
Obama administration’s refusal to disclose documents to the investigative
committees their party chaired to their vocal support of the Trump
administration’s similar refusal to committees controlled by

Stuart Hall, Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post-structuralist debate, 2 CRIT.
STUD. MASS COMM. 91, 113-14 n.2 (1985); see also Jennifer Daryl Slack, The theory and method of
articulation in cultural studies, in STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES 112
(Kuan-Hsing Chen & David Morley eds., 1996).
273. See supra Part II-B (describing the role of politics in transparency’s rise and the norm’s use as
a weapon against political opponents).
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Democrats 274—as well as the Democrats’ parallel reversal.275 Voters and
the broader public support a particular elected official, candidate, or party
based more on substantive, symbolic, or partisan concerns than for fealty
to transparency as an abstract administrative norm enforced by
technocratic rules. Transparency is politically imposed on a political
system; it is not surprising, therefore, that compliance with Freedom of
Information laws matters more to the party out of power than for the
executive against whom it is used, and that interest in compliance also
reverses in partisan fashion when political fortunes shift. President
Trump’s distinct relationship to transparency accentuated a phenomenon
that has existed since the very beginning of the open government
movement.
The danger that all populist movements represent upon winning
elections and assuming power is that their skepticism of pluralistic norms
and democratic institutions ultimately disfigures those norms and
institutions and subverts democracy.276 A purely populist understanding
of transparency, divorced from the technocratic rules and institutional
machinery required to force disclosure, will harm democracy and
accountability. Notwithstanding his flaunting of disclosure norms
regarding his financial interests, President Trump and his administration
did not successfully destroy or abandon transparency as an administrative
norm. They were challenged by other branches of government and the
press in their efforts to staunch the flow of government information. At
the same time, his emphasis on a more personal, affective notion of
transparency via public rallies and social media threatens rebalancing
transparency towards a populist, more explicitly political mode of
transparency. This shift may have long-term, disfiguring effects on open
government law and norms, and especially on executive branch
compliance with it.

274. See JM Rieger, Then and Now: How Republicans Downplay Subpoenas When They Target
Trump, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/22/then-nowhow-republicans-downplay-subpoenas-when-they-target-trump/ (noting Republican hypocrisy).
275. See Josh Gerstein, Subpoena Fight Over Operation Fast and Furious Documents Finally
Settled, POLITICO (May 9, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/09/fast-and-furiousdocuments-holder-1313120 (reporting on settlement of lawsuit between the House and Department of
Justice over subpoenas in “Fast and Furious” gunrunning case).
276. Nadia Urbinati developed the argument that populism disfigures rather than destroys
democracy. See URBINATI, ME THE PEOPLE, supra note 21, at 22; URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED:
OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE 128-31 (2014).
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